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Abstract
In 1900 only six percent of unwed females engaged in premarital sex. Now, three quarters do. The
sexual revolution is studied here using an equilibrium matching model, where the costs of premarital
sex fall over time due to technological improvement in contraceptives. Individuals di¤er in their
desire for sex. Given this, people tend to circulate in social groups where prospective partners
share their views on premarital sex. To the extent that a societys customs and mores reect the
aggregation of decentralized decision making by its members, shifts in the economic environment
may induce changes in what is perceived as culture.
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Why is there so much social change today, and why was there so little in
ancient times? The most probable answer, the result of quite extensive study,
is mechanical invention and scientic discovery. There is no doubt that use-
ful inventions and researches cause social changes. Steam and steel were major
forces in developing our extensive urban life. Gunpowder inuenced the decline
of feudalism. The discovery of seed-planting destroyed the hunting cultures and
brought a radically new form of social life. The automobile is helping to create
the metropolitan community. Small inventions, likewise, have far-reaching ef-
fects. The coin-in-the-slot device changes the range and nature of salesmanship,
radically a¤ects di¤erent businesses, and creates unemployment. The e¤ects of
the invention of contraceptives on population and social institutions is so vast as
to defy human estimation. It is obvious, then, that social changes are caused by
inventions. William F. Ogburn (1936, pp. 1-2)
1 Introduction
There may be no better illustration of social change than the sexual revolution that occurred
during the 20th century. In 1900 almost no unmarried teenage girl engaged in premarital
sex; only a paltry 6 percent see Figure 1, left panel. By 2002 a large majority (roughly
75 percent) had experienced this. What caused this: the contraception revolution. (Sources
for the U.S. data displayed in all gures and tables are detailed in the Appendix, Section
12.5.) Both the technology for contraception and education about its practice changed
dramatically over the course of the last century. Another reection of the change in sexual
mores is the rise in the number of sexual partners that unmarried females have. For women
born between 1933 and 1942, the majority of those who engaged in premarital sex had only
one partner by age 20, presumably their future husband see Figure 1, right panel. By the
1963-1972 cohort, the majority of these women had at least 2 partners. Notwithstanding the
great improvement in contraception technology and education, the number of out-of-wedlock
births to females rose from 3 percent in 1920 to 33 percent in 1999 Figure 1, left panel.
Despite great public concern about teenage sexual behavior in recent years, there has not
been any attempt to build formal models of it. The current work will attempt to ll this
void.
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Figure 1: (i) Percentage of 19 year-old females with premarital sexual experience (left panel);
(ii) Out-of-wedlock births, percentage (left panel); (iii) Number of partners by age 20 for
women engaging in premarital sex, frequency distribution by birth cohort (right panel)
1.1 The Analysis
The rise in premarital sex will be analyzed within the context of an equilibrium unisex
matching model. The model has three salient features. First, when engaging in premarital
sex individuals deliberate the costs and benets from this risky activity. The availability
of contraceptives and abortion will lower the costs of premarital sex. Second, individuals
di¤er in their tastes for sex. A person desires a mate who is similarly inclined so that they
can enjoy the same lifestyle. This leads to a bilateral search structure. Third, given that
people desire to nd partners that share their views on sex, they will pick to circulate within
social groups who subscribe to their beliefs. This is the most e¢ cient way to nd a suitable
partner. The membership of social groups is therefore endogenous. Shifts in the sizes of the
groups reect social change.
It is established theoretically that in the developed matching models steady state the
population sorts very neatly into two social groups.1 Those who want an abstinent relation-
1 This notion is not without some precedence. For example, Burdett and Coles (1997) illustrate within
the context of a marital search model how people may wed exclusively within their own social class (which
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ship circulate exclusively among people who share the same ideal, while those who prefer a
promiscuous one associate with others who desire the same thing. This allows for e¢ cient
search, which would not transpire in the steady state of a standard search model. It does
not have to happen outside of a steady state. It is also shown theoretically that the model is
likely to display rapid transitional dynamics. This is desirable since sexual practice appears
to have responded quite quickly to the availability of new and improved contraception. The
model is solved numerically in order to assess its ability to explain the rise in premarital sex
over the twentieth century. A key step in the simulation is the construction of a time series
reecting the cost of sex. This series is based upon the observed e¤ectiveness and use of vari-
ous types of contraception. The framework can replicate well the rapid rise in premarital sex
that the last one hundred years witnessed. In particular, it is found that: (i) the reduction in
the risk of pregnancy due to availability of new and improved contraceptions encouraged the
rise of premarital sex; (ii) increased accessibility to abortion promoted premarital sex. The
model also does a reasonable job mimicing the rise in teenage pregnancies. That it can do
so is not a forgone conclusion. On the one hand, an increase in the e¢ cacy of contraception
implies that there should be less pregnancies. On the other, it promotes more premarital
sex. The end result depends on how these two factors interact.
The search framework developed here has implications that would be harder to examine
using other paradigms. First, the model is able to match both the fraction of teenagers having
sex in a given period, as well as the proportion who have had sex by age 19. Likewise, the
model can give predictions on the fraction of teenagers becoming pregnant each period, and
the proportion who become pregnant by age 19. These two measures would be hard to
disentangle in a static model. Yet, they might have di¤erent relevancies for public policies.
The former could be indicative of the aggregate per-period costs of premarital sex, the latter
a measure of the risk of premarital sex for a teenage girl. Second, the model can match the
median duration of an adolescent relationship and the average number of partners for sexually
active teenagers. In the data there is a huge dispersion across the number of sexual partners.
The current prototype has di¢ culty matching this latter fact, but future versions might be
is some range of types). Search is not directed within ones own social class, however. People look over the
entire marriage market. An equilibrium may obtain where individuals choose to reject all potential mates
below their own social class.
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able to do so. Modelling the average number of, and the dispersion in, sexual partners
is likely to be important for shedding light on the spread of sexually transmitted diseases
such as AIDS/HIV. The adjustment of individual behavior to the risk of the infection, to
prophylaxes that change the risk, and to the likelihood of having the disease based upon past
behavior, could be important for understanding its transmission. Individuals could search
for partners within certain risk pools, depending on their preferences for di¤erent types of
sex. Future versions of the framework could be used to study this, something that would be
di¢ cult to do in a static framework.
The investigation is conducted within the context of a unisex framework. The model is
used to address some stylized facts concerning female sexual behavior, such as the aforemen-
tioned rise in out-of-wedlock births. The costs of engaging in premarital sex are obviously
di¤erent for males and females. An outof-wedlock birth may severely a¤ect a young girls
educational and job prospects as well as her opportunities for nding a future mate. There-
fore, girls are likely to be less promiscuous than boys. Additionally, promiscuity may di¤er
by family background, because girls from poorer families may feel that they have less to lose
from an out-of-wedlock birth. These are important considerations, but incorporating them
would introduce extra complications.2 The unisex abstraction conducted here really does
little violence to the questions poised by Figure 1.
There is empirical work that connects di¤erences in culture to di¤erences in economic
decision making. Guiliano (2007) nds that, in the wake of the sexual revolution, young
Americans whose parents came from Southern Europe are now more likely to live at home
compared with those from Northern Europe. She argues that family ties are stronger for
Southerners and that a liberalization of sexual attitudes allowed young adults to remain in
their parentshome while enjoying an active sexual life. Likewise, Fernández and Fogli (2009)
examine fertility and labor-force participation rates for American born women whose parents
were immigrants. They argue that ancestral di¤erences in family culture have explanatory
2 A model with these features is presented in Fernández-Villaverde, Greenwood, and Guner (2009). Their
analysis is in the spirit of Becker and Mulligan (1997) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2008). In particular, a childs
preferences are a¤ected by parental, and institutional, investments. The focus of the Fernández-Villaverde,
Greenwood, and Guner (2009) is on the socialization of children by their parents and institutions such as
the church. They illustrate how the inculcation of sexual mores is a¤ected by the technological environment.
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power for work and fertility behavior today. The current paper should not be read as saying
that culture does not matter, but rather that some part of it may be endogenous.3
2 Environment
Suppose that there are two social classes in society, one whose members are abstinent,
the other whose members are promiscuous. Members in a social class circulate amongst
themselves. Each class is a separate world, so to speak, but the members of a particular
class are free to switch to the other class at any time. Social change will be measured by
the shift in membership between the two classes.
Each member of society is indexed by the variable j 2 J = fj1; j2;    ; jng, which
represents his or her joy from sex. The value of j is known by an individual. Let j be
distributed across individuals according to the density function J(ji) = i, with 0 < i < 1,Pn
i=1 i = 1, and j1 < j2 <    < jn. Suppose that time ows discretely. At the beginning
of each period, an unattached member in a class will match with another single individual
in the same class with probability . The partners type will be randomly determined in
accordance with the type distribution prevailing at that time within the class. This couple
must then make two intertwined decisions: whether or not to stay together for the period,
and which social class to join. If they choose not to stay together, then they must wait until
the next period for another opportunity to match. With probability 1    an unattached
person fails to match with another single one. These individuals just decide upon which
social class to join. This will inuence the type of mate that they might draw next period.
3 It may take some time for culture to respond to a new technological environment. Sometimes the change
is sudden, other times it may be more gradual or smooth. For example, social behavior may be governed
by normssee the classic paper by Cole, Mailath, and Postelwaite (1992). Individuals who transgress the
norm may be collectively outcast or shunned by other members of society. Given this fact most individuals
may rationally choose to subscribe to the social norm. As the economic environment changes it may become
increasingly impossible to sustain such a norm. Eventually, it collapses. Or, the process might be a gradual or
smooth change in socialization practices in response to shifts in the environment, as is modeled in Fernández-
Villaverde, Greenwood, and Guner (2009). Alternatively, Fernández, Fogli and Olivetti (2004) assume that
childrenspreferences are a function of their parentslifestyles (in a habit-formation way) which may change
slowly over time. Another example of culture adapting to technological progress is contained in Doepke and
Tertilt (forth.). They argue that womens liberation in the 19th century was the result of rising returns to
human capital formation for females. In extending rights to women, men faced a trade-o¤ between losing
power with their own wives but emancipating other mens wives, such as their own daughters. This trade
o¤ resolves in favor of extending rights for all women when the returns to human capital are high enough.
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Similarly, at the beginning of each period, matches in each class from the previous period
break up with probability . Couples in the surviving matches must also make two inex-
tricably linked decisions; to wit, whether or not to remain together and which social class
to join. If they choose to break up then they must wait until the next period for another
matching opportunity. Like single agents who fail to match, couples whose relationships
break up exogenously just decide upon which social class to join.
Let a matched person in the abstinence class enjoy a level of momentary utility level
of u, and a single person realize a momentary utility level of w, with u > w. A matched
person in the promiscuity class realizes a momentary utility level of u + j   c, where j is
the joy from sex and c is the expected cost of it say due to an out-of-wedlock birth or a
sexually transmitted disease. Note that c cant represent a stigma e¤ect since this is really an
attitude. Change in attitudes and behavior are what is being modelled here. An unmatched
person in this class attains a utility of w. Individuals discount next periods utility by the
factor . Assume that u, w, j, and c are specied in a way that guarantees that expected
lifetime utility is always positive. Assume that u, w, j, and c are nite, which ensures that
expected lifetime utility is bounded.
To complete the setup, some structure will be placed on the population. First, the size
of the population will be normalized to one. Second, each period a fraction 1    of the
population will move on to another phase of life, which will be interpreted as adulthood.
This latter phase of life will be taken to be a facsimile of their current life, but in a di¤erent
location. These people are selected at random and are replenished by an equal ow of young
unmatched individuals. Let couples relocate together. So, assume that each single, and each
couple, face a relocation probability of 1  .4
4 Making an adults world look like a teenagers one requires some additional assumptions. First, suppose
that adults survive with probability 2   1. Second, assume that some new unmatched adults ow in from
another source at rate 1   ; i.e., there is a ow in of unmatched adults who somehow missed teenage life.
These two assumptions ensure that an adults world will have the same type distributions as the teenagers
one. Third, when adults die assume that they realize a utility level of zero from then. Fourth, set the
discount factor for an adult, e, so that e = =[2   1]. The last two assumptions guarantee that the adults
programming problem will be a copy of the teenagers one, even though the former faces death. These
assumptions are made to ensure logical consistency, not realism. Alternatively, one could just simply assume
that in adult life one obtains an expected lifetime utility of V , a constant. Since a teen shifts into adult
life with an exogenous state-independent probability, , this will not a¤ect any choice that he makes. A
teens e¤ective discount factor would be  = b(1  ), where b is his subjective discount factor. To get the
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Figure 2: Social Change
The idea is that over time the cost of premarital sex, c, declines due to technological
progress in contraception and improvements in birth control education. As a consequence,
people move out of the abstinence class, A, into the promiscuity class, P. The situation is
portrayed in Figure 2, by the arrow moving left to right. As will be seen, there may also
be some secondary movement from P to A. For example, some people may choose to live a
promiscuous lifestyle rather than lose their partner. When one of these matches breaks up,
one individual may move back to A.
3 Decision Problems
Let Am(j;ej) denote the expected lifetime utility for an individual of type j who is currently in
an abstinent match with a partner of type ej. An individual does not experience any joy from
sex while abstinent. But, s/he could in the future. Thus, Am should still be a function of j.
Also, an individuals joy from sex does not depend directly upon his partners type, ej. Still,
equilibrium discussed in the text just set b = =(1  ).
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he cares indirectly about ej because this will delimit his future matching possibilities, as will
be seen. Next, dene As(j) to be the expected lifetime utility for a single (or unmatched)
agent in class A. Turn now to the promiscuous class. Here Pm(j;ej) will represent the
expected lifetime utility for individual j who is currently in a promiscuous match with ej,
and P s(j) will proxy for the expected lifetime utility for a single agent in class P. Finally,
suppose that j and ej meet. What will be the outcome of this meeting? Let am(j;ej) be the
equilibrium probability that an abstinent relationship will occur, pm(j;ej) denote the odds
that a promiscuous one transpires, and 1 am(j;ej) pm(j;ej) give the chance that no match
will ensue.
As will be seen, these equilibrium matching probabilities split the space of potential
pairwise matches, J  J , into four types of zones: viz, one where both parties desire an
abstinent relationship so that am(j;ej) = 1; another where both want a sexual one implying
that pm(j;ej) = 1; a mixing region where one party prefers an abstinent relationship, the
other side a sexual one, but both prefer some sort of relationship to none, so that 0 <
am(j;ej);pm(j;ej) < 1; a zone where no relationship of any sort is possible and am(j;ej) =
pm(j;ej) = 0. An example of this is shown in Figure 3, which is detailed later onin this
gure both parties prefer some sort of relationship to none at all.
3.1 The Abstinence Class, A
Suppose person j is matched with ej in A. The recursion dening the value of this match for
j, or the function Am(j;ej), is given by
Am(j;ej) = u+ (1  )[am0(j;ej)Am0(j;ej) + pm0(j;ej)Pm0(j;ej)](1)
+f + (1  )[1  am0(j;ej)  pm0(j;ej)]gmaxfAs0(j); P s0(j)g;
where in standard fashion a prime attached to a variable or function denotes its value next
period. The rst term on the righthand side is the momentary utility realized today from
an abstinent match, u. The rest of the terms give the discounted value of the lifetime utility
that j can expect from tomorrow on. Note that his current match with ej will survive into
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next period with probability (1 ).5 At this time the couple can decide to remain together
in an abstinent relationship, switch to a promiscuous one, or break up. Recall that the
function am0(j;ej) reports the equilibrium probability that an abstinent match between j andej will occur next period.6 Thus, the term (1 )am0(j;ej)Am0(j;ej) represents the component
of expected lifetime utility from next period onward that is associated with the possibility of
an abstinent match. Likewise, the part of expected lifetime utility linked to a promiscuous
match is given by (1  )pm0(j;ej)Pm0(j;ej). Now a match may not occur next period because
the pair breaks up, either exogenously or endogenously. A match breaks up exogenously with
probability , and endogenously with probability (1  )[1  am0(j;ej) pm0(j;ej)]. When the
match breaks up person j must decide whether to enjoy his single life in either the abstinent
or promiscuous class. The term f+(1 )[1 am0(j;ej) pm0(j;ej)]gmaxfAs0(j); P s0(j)g gives
the part of expected lifetime utility that is associated with single life next period. When
single at that time person j will choose to join the social class (A or P) that maximizes
expected lifetime utility so that he will realize the level of bliss given by maxfAs0(j); P s0(j)g.
The determination of the functions am and pm is discussed below. They will be predicated
upon the preferences that each party in the match has toward a relationship, if they desire
one at all. Last, note that time is implicitly a state variable in the above recursion, since
the costs of premarital sex will be changing over time in a manner to be specied later.
Therefore, individuals will be rationally incorporating any changes in the cost of premarital
sex into their decision making.7
Alternatively, consider the case where j is alone in A. His expected lifetime utility is
5 Note that the pair, j and ej, will move to a new location next period with probability 1   . But, by
assumption js life will continue on in identical fashion there, since the new location is an exact copy of the
old one. Thus, there is no need to incorporate this survival probability into the recursion. It does enter into
the laws of motion for the type distributions.
6 As will be seen, these probabilities must be determined in equilibrium as a function of ones partners
decisions. It is this factor that distinguishes a bilateral search from the standard one, as typied by the
job-search models of Andolfatto and Gomme (1996), Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) and Jovanovic (1987).
Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000) develop a bilateral search model of marriage that is similar in some
respects to the framework developed here.
7 Specically, since the costs of premarital sex are assumed to be a function of time so will be the
functions Am(j;ej), As(j), Pm(j;ej), P s(j), am(j;ej), pm(j;ej), etc. The dependence of these functions on time
is connoted by the use of the prime symbol. A formal denition of the nonstationary rational expectations
equilibrium that is being modelled is provided in Section 4.
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given by the function As(j), which reads
As(j) = w + 
nX
i=1
as0i [a
m0(j;eji)Am0(j;eji) + pm0(j;eji)Pm0(j;eji)](2)
+ f(1  ) + 
nX
i=1
as0i [1  am0(j;eji)  pm0(j;eji)]gmaxfAs0(j); P s0(j)g:
Note that js draw for a partner, ej, next period will depend upon the type distribution for
unmatched agents that will prevail in A at that time. This type distribution is given by the
as0i s, with 0  as0i  1 and
Pn
i=1 a
s0
i = 1. This distribution is endogenously determined.
3.2 The Promiscuity Class, P
When person j matches with ej in the promiscuity class he will realize an expected lifetime
utility level of
Pm(j;ej) = u+ j   c+ (1  )[am0(j;ej)Am0(j;ej) + pm0(j;ej)Pm0(j;ej)](3)
+f + (1  )[1  am0(j;ej)  pm0(j;ej)]gmaxfAs0(j); P s0(j)g:
In the above problem the individual experiences a joy from sex, net of costs, in the amount
j   c. Unmatched person j will attain
P s(j) = w + 
nX
i=1
ps0i [a
m0(j;eji)Am0(j;eji) + pm0(j;eji)Pm0(j;eji)](4)
+ f(1  ) + 
nX
i=1
ps0i [1  am0(j;eji)  pm0(j;eji)]gmaxfAs0(j); P s0(j)g:
Note that js draw for a partner next period will depend upon the type distribution for
unmatched agents that will prevail in P at that time, or the ps0i s with 0  ps0i  1 andPn
i=1 p
s0
i = 1. The value of searching in either A or P next period will depend upon the type
distributions, as0 and ps0, that exist in these classes then.
3.3 Social Class Membership Decision, Choosing A or P
Now, consider individual j who is matched with partner ej. An abstinent match with ej may
be individual js rst choice. Let the indicator 1a(j;ej) return a value of one if this is the
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case, and a value of zero otherwise. The indicator function 1a(ej; j) is then given by
(5)
1a(j;ej) =
8<: 1; if Am(j;ej) > maxfPm(j;ej); As(j); P s(j)g (abstinent match is rst choice);0; otherwise.
Observe that the analogous indicator function for person ej will simply read 1a(ej; j) =
1aT (j;ej), where the subscript T denotes the transpose of a matrix. Now, it may be the
case that person j would prefer a promiscuous match with ej, but this isnt feasible. Still, j
may prefer to live with ej in A, relative to living alone in either A or P. Let the indicator
function 2a;s(j;ej) return a value of one if j prefers a match with ej in A, relative to single
life in either A or P, and a value of zero otherwise. Thus, 2a;s(j;ej) is given by
(6)
2a;s(j;ej) =
8<: 1; if Am(j;ej) > maxfAs(j); P s(j)g (abstinent match preferred to single life);0; otherwise.
Person js preferences towards promiscuous matches can be analyzed in similar fashion.
To this end, let the indicator function 1p(j;ej) return a value of one if j would prefer to live
with ej in P over all other options, and a value of zero otherwise. This indicator function is
dened by
(7)
1p(j;ej) =
8<: 1; if Pm(j;ej) > maxfAm(j;ej); As(j); P s(j)g (promiscuous match is rst choice),0; otherwise.
The situation where j prefers to live with ej in P, relative to living alone in either A or P,
can be captured by the indicator function 2p;s(j;ej):
(8)
2p;s(j;ej) =
8<: 1; if Pm(j;ej) > maxfAs(j); P s(j)g (promiscuous match preferred to single life);0; otherwise.
Consider an unmatched agent. S/he must choose between searching for a prospective
mate in the abstinent or promiscuous class. Let 1a;ps (j) denote the decision rule for an
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unmatched individual. In particular,
(9) 1a;ps (j) =
8<: 1; if As(j) > P s(j), (single in A preferred to single in P),0; otherwise.
Suppose that j and ej have met, either through a new or pre-existing match. The prob-
abilities of abstinent or promiscuous relationships, am(j;ej) and pm(j;ej), occurring can now
be constructed. In particular,
am(j;ej) = 1a(j;ej)1aT (j;ej) + 1a(j;ej)2p;s(j;ej)1pT (j;ej)2a;sT (j;ej)=2(10)
+1aT (j;ej)2p;sT (j;ej)1p(j;ej)2a;s(j;ej)=2
+1a(j;ej)[1  2p;s(j;ej)][1  1aT (j;ej)]2a;sT (j;ej)
+1aT (j;ej)[1  2p;sT (j;ej)][1  1a(j;ej)]2a;s(j;ej);
and
pm(j;ej) = 1p(j;ej)1pT (j;ej) + 1a(j;ej)2p;s(j;ej)1pT (j;ej)2a;sT (j;ej)=2(11)
+1aT (j;ej)2p;sT (j;ej)1p(j;ej)2a;s(j;ej)=2
+[1  1p(j;ej)]2p;s(j;ej)1pT (j;ej)[1  2a;sT (j;ej)]
+[1  1pT (j;ej)]2p;sT (j;ej)1p(j;ej)[1  2a;s(j;ej)]:
Take the expression for am(j;ej). It is not as formidable as it looks. The rst term gives
the situation where an abstinent match is both js and ejs rst choice. When this occurs
1a(j;ej)1aT (j;ej) = 1. The remaining terms enumerate situations where an abstinent match is
not one persons rst choice for a match, but they still prefer it to single life.
Consider the second term. Suppose that person js rst choice is an abstinent relation-
ship, but she would be willing to accept a promiscuous one as opposed to being single. In
this circumstance 1a(j;ej)2p;s(j;ej) = 1, and is zero otherwise. Additionally, suppose that her
partner wants a promiscuous match the most, but prefers an abstinent relationship to single
life. Here, 1pT (j;ej)2a;sT (j;ej) = 1. How will the couple resolve this di¤erence in tastes? Simply
assume that they just ip a coin between the two alternatives. The odds of an abstinent
match are then 1a(j;ej)2p;s(j;ej)1pT (j;ej)2a;sT (j;ej)=2 = 1=2. This expression will return a value
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of zero in any other circumstance. The third term just reports the situation when the roles
for j and ej are reversed. Therefore, when two people j and ej have the above-mentioned
di¤erence in tastes, half of the time the match will be resolved in js favor, while the other
half it will be decided to ejs benet. (This is also true on average within a given match over
time.)
At rst sight, the mixing situation may seem strange in that certain pairs might have sex
in some periods and not in others. Think about these types of relationships as having an
intermediate level of sexual activity; they are less active than pairings with pm(j;ej) = 1, and
more active than ones with am(j;ej) = 1. This could be important for modelling issues such
as teenage pregnancy, or the incidences of diseases such as AIDS/HIV. In a more general
model, one of the parties may want to make some sort of transfer to the other in order to
attain what they desire. The transfer could be in terms of e¤ort or gifts. One could think
about these transfers as being undertaken via some sort of bargaining scheme, or as the
outcome of a competitive equilibrium where they are explicitly priced. Here matches would
be (more) e¢ cient. In lieu of these possibilities, the above lottery scheme reconciles the
di¤erences in tastes about as best as can be done.
The fourth term species the case where person j will refuse a promiscuous match. If
js rst choice is an abstinent match, and shell refuse a promiscuous one, then 1a(j;ej)[1 
2p;s(j;ej)] = 1. Likewise, when ejs best option is a promiscuous match, but hell accept
an abstinent one, then [1   1aT (j;ej)]2a;sT (j;ej) = 1. The odds of an abstinent match in this
situation are given by 1a(j;ej)[1   2p;s(j;ej)][1   1aT (j;ej)]2a;sT (j;ej) = 1. Again, it is easy to
deduce that this expression will be zero in any other situation. The roles between j and ej
are reversed in the fth term. Note that by construction all of the terms in (10) are mutually
exclusive and that am(j;ej) 2 f0; 1=2; 1g. Likewise, pm(j;ej) 2 f0; 1=2; 1g. Last the odds of
no relationship are just simply given by 1  am(j;ej)  pm(j;ej) 2 f0; 1g.
Observe that equations (1) to (11) jointly determine a solution for the value functions
Am(j;ej), As(j), Pm(j;ej), P s(j), the decision rules 1a(j;ej) , 2a;s(j;ej),    , 1a;ps (j), and the
matching functions, am(j;ej) and pm(j;ej), contingent upon the type distributions of un-
matched agents in A and P, or the asis and psis.
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4 Equilibrium
Computing a solution to the model involves calculating the time paths for the type distrib-
utions of unmatched agents in A and P. The solutions to the recursions (2) and (4) depend
directly upon these distributions the asis and p
s
is. Note these distributions will indirectly
inuence (1) and (3) as well. Hence, the equilibrium social class membership functions (9)
to (11) will depend upon these distributions. In turn, the evolution of these distributions
will be functions of these membership decisions, am, ap, and 1a;ps . Let M
a(j;ej) denote
the nonnormalized distribution over matched pairs in A , and Sa(j) denote the analogous
(nonnormalized) distribution over singles. Likewise, Mp(j;ej) and Sp(j) will represent the
distributions for matched and unmatched agents in P. Note that asi = Sa(ji)=kSa(jk) and
psi = S
p(ji)=kS
p(jk). Write the law of motion for these distributions as
(12) (Ma0; Sa0;Mp0; Sp0) = L(Ma; Sa;Mp; Sp; am; ap;1a;ps ):
The operator L is fully specied in the Appendix, Section 12.2. Thus, computing an equi-
librium for the model involves solving a xed-point problem.
Denition For a given time path describing the costs of premarital sex, fctg1t=1, and some
initial type distributions, Ma1 (j;ej), Mp1 (j;ej), Sa1 (j), and Sp1(j), a nonstationary rational
expectations equilibrium is represented by time paths for the value functions,fAmt (j;ej)g1t=1,
fAst(j)g1t=1, fPmt (j;ej)g1t=1, and fP st (j)g1t=1, the decision rules, f1at (j;ej)g1t=1, f2a;st (j;ej)g1t=1,
f1pt (j;ej)g1t=1, f2p;st (j;ej)g1t=1, and f1a;ps;t (j)g1t=1, the matching functions for couples, famt (j;ej)g1t=1
and fpmt (j;ej)g1t=1, and the type distributions, fMat (j;ej)g1t=1, fMpt (j;ej)g1t=1, fSat (j)g1t=1, and
fSpt (j)g1t=1, such that:
1. The sequence of value functions, fAmt (j;ej)g1t=1, fAst(j)g1t=1, fPmt (j;ej)g1t=1, and fP st (j)g1t=1,
solve the recursions (1) to (4), given the time paths for the matching functions for cou-
ples, famt (j;ej)g1t=1 and fpmt (j;ej)g1t=1, and the type distributions for singles, fSat (j)g1t=1,
and fSpt (j)g1t=1. [Recall that asi;t = Sat (ji)=kSat (jk) and psi;t = Spt (ji)=kSpt (jk).]
2. The sequence of decisions rules and matching functions f1at (j;ej)g1t=1, f2a;st (j;ej)g1t=1,
f1pt (j;ej)g1t=1, f2p;st (j;ej)g1t=1, f1a;ps;t (j)g1t=1, famt (j;ej)g1t=1, and fpmt (j;ej)g1t=1, satisfy (5)
to (11), given the time paths for the value functions, fAmt (j;ej)g1t=1, fAst(j)g1t=1, fPmt (j;ej)g1t=1,
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and fP st (j)g1t=1 and the type distributions for singles, fSat (j)g1t=1, and fSpt (j)g1t=1. (Re-
call the subscript T denotes the transpose of a matrix.)
3. The sequence for the type distributions, fMat (j;ej)g1t=1, fMpt (j,ej)g1t=1, fSat (j)g1t=1, and
fSpt (j)g1t=1, solve (12), given the social class decision rule for singles, f1a;ps;t (j)g1t=1, and
the matching functions, famt (j;ej)g1t=1 and fpmt (j;ej)g1t=1.
At a general level not much more can be said about the properties of the economys equi-
librium. Some insight into the model, however, can be gleaned by undertaking the following
three tasks in turn. First, the solution to the models steady state will be examined. Second,
the transitional dynamics for the model will be fully characterized for the special case of a
once-and-for-all change in c. Third, the solution to the above equilibrium will be computed
numerically in order to speak to the issue at hand, the change in sexual mores for the al-
gorithm see the Appendix, Section 12.4. After all, the question of whether or not the above
framework is capable of explaining the change in sexual mores is quantitative in nature.
5 Steady-State Analysis
Suppose that c is constant over time. What would a steady state for the above model
look like? It seems reasonable to conjecture that those who enjoy sex, relatively speaking,
will circulate within the promiscuous class, and those who dont, wont. To pursue this
conjecture, suppose that there exists some threshold type, jb, such that fj1;    ; jbg 2 A
and fjb+1;    ; jng 2 P. In fact, one might suspect that jb < c < jb+1; that is, those
who have a joy for sex that is higher than its expected cost will be a member of P, and
those who dont will associate with people in A. (To simplify the analysis, without any real
loss of generality, always suppose that c lies strictly between two js.) If this conjecture
is true, then a partners type in each class wont matter since the world is split into two
noncommunicating social groups. That is, anyone in A will be willing to accept an abstinent
match with anybody else in A, while all individuals in P will take a promiscuous relationship
with any other person in P.
Lemma 1 (Separate Worlds) There exists a steady-state equilibrium such that ji 2 A for
all ji < c, and ji 2 P for ji > c.
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Proof. See the Appendix, Section 12.1.1.
Given the above lemma, there exists a steady state where there is a dividing line in
the j distribution between the two classes given by c. Individuals with a j < c choose
to live abstinent lives, and those with a j > c promiscuous ones. The steady state of
a standard search model would not exhibit this type of e¢ cient matching. Hence, the
(nonnormalized) type distributions in A and P will be given by f1;    ; b; 0;    ; 0g and
f0;    ; 0; b+1;    ; ng, respectively, where b solves
(13) jb < c < jb+1:
The number of people circulating in A isPbi=1 i, so that the size of the population in P is
given by
(14) #P = 1 
bX
i=1
i:
In a steady state the fraction of people who are attached in either class A or P will be given
by
(15)  =

1  (1  ) + ;
so that the fraction who are unattached is
1   = 1  (1  )
1  (1  ) +  .
Note that  does not depend upon the properties of the type distribution or on the shape
of J(j). This is also true for any other statistic describing the steady-state properties of
matching within a class. Last, note that the size of the promiscuous class in a steady-state
is a nonincreasing function of the cost of premarital sex, as the following lemma states.
Lemma 2 (Sexual Revolution) The steady-state number of people engaging in premarital
sex (weakly) increases with a fall in the cost of premarital sex.
Proof. As c decreases the b that solves (13) will fall, given that j1 < j2 <    < jn. The
result then follows from (14).
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6 Transitional Dynamics
6.1 The Impact of a Once-and-for-All Decline in c
As an aid toward gaining some understanding about how the transitional dynamics for
the model work, consider the impact of a once-and-for-all decline in c from c to c. In
particular, suppose that the economy is initially resting in a steady state associated with
c = c. In line with the analysis of Section 5, there will exist a b such that jb < c < jb+1.
The type distribution in A will be given by f1;    ; b; 0;    ; 0g, and the one in P by
f0;    ; 0; b+1;    ; ng. In each class a fraction , as specied by (15), of the populace
will be matched. Suppose that c suddenly drops to c, and stays at that value forever
after. Then, there will be new steady-state type distributions in A and P represented
by f1;    ; d; 0;    ; 0g and f0;    ; 0; d+1;    ; ng, where jd <c< jd+1 assume a large
enough shift in c so that d < b.
Now, think about the following process of convergence between the two steady states,
which will be veried later:
1. To begin with, take an attached (j;ej) pair in A in the old steady state. If (j;ej) 2
fjd+1;    ; jbg  fjd+1;    ; jbg they will move immediately to P. Simply put, why
should these individuals wait? There will be 
Pb
i=d+1
Pb
k=d+1 i
ek agents in this
category, where  is given by (15). Since the adjustment here is immediate, this case
is a force for rapid transitional dynamics.
2. Likewise, consider unattached individuals in A. If j 2 fjd+1;    ; jbg they too will
immediately enter P. Again, what would be the advantage to waiting? There are (1 
)
Pb
i=d+1 i such agents. Thus, the models transitional dynamics will be very fast on
this account. Note that this implies that the one-step-ahead unmatched type distribu-
tions inA andP will have the forms fas01 ;    ; as0d ; 0;    ; 0g and f0;    ; 0; ps0d+1;    ; ps0ng.
By employing similar reasoning, it can be deduced that this latter feature will hold
along all points of the transition path.
3. There may be matches in the old steady state for which j 2 fj1;    ; jdg and ej 2
fjd+1;    ; jbg, yet it remains optimal for (j;ej) to stay attached in A. Here person ejs
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type is not high enough to warrant breaking up a relationship with j and searching
by himself in P. There are two types of situations here. Those where person j is
willing to engage in a mixing relationship [am(j;ej) = 1=2], and those where she isnt
[am(j;ej) = 1]. There will be Pdi=1Pbk=d+1 am(ji;ejk)i ek people in this situation.
The survival rate for these matches is (1 ). The ejs who are still around will switch
to P after a breakup.
4. Analogously, there may be matches in the old steady state for which j 2 fj1;    ; jdg
and ej 2 fjd+1;    ; jbg where it is optimal for (j;ej) to move to P. Here individ-
ual js unfavorable view of the net gain from sex with ej is not bad enough to jus-
tify terminating her relationship with ej and searching alone in A. There will be

Pd
i=1
Pb
k=d+1 p
m(ji;ejk)i ek agents in this position. The survival rate for these
matches is (1  ). The surviving js will enter A after a breakup.
5. Finally, there may be some matches (j;ej) 2 fj1;    ; jdg  fjd+1;    ; jbg in the old
steady state for which it is optimal for the couple to break up. Here, person j will
search for a new mate in A while ej will look in P. There will be Pdi=1Pbk=d+1[1  
am(ji;ejk) pm(ji;ejk)]i ek agents in this case. Since the adjustment here is immediate,
this case speaks for rapid transitional dynamics.
The above line of reasoning suggests that the lemma below should hold the above logic
is veried during the course of the proof.
Lemma 3 (Rapid Transitional Dynamics) Upon a once-and-for-all decrease in c, the (non-
normalized) type distribution in A immediately jumps from
f1;    ; b; 0;    ; 0g
to
f1   
Pb
k=d+1 p
m(j1;ejk)1ek;    ; d   Pbk=d+1 pm(jd;ejk)dek;

Pd
h=1 a
m(jh;ejd+1)hed+1;    ; Pdh=1 am(jh;ejb)heb; 0;    ; 0g;
where d < b. The i-step-ahead type distribution in A (for i  1) is given by
f1   [(1  )]i
Pb
k=d+1 p
m(j1;ejk)1ek;    ; d   [(1  )]iPbk=d+1 pm(jd;ejk)dek;(16)
[(1  )]iPdh=1 am(jh;ejd+1)hed+1;    ; [(1  )]iPdh=1 am(jh;ejb)heb; 0;    ; 0g:
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Proof. See the Appendix, Section 12.1.2.
To summarize, following a once-and-for-all decline in c some matched couples will imme-
diately move from A to P. Sometimes one member might move somewhat reluctantly, in
the sense that they would prefer a match in A rather than P. This ideal situation isnt on
the table, because their partner prefers a relationship in P. Over time these matches will
break up exogenously and the (surviving) low-j partner will return to A. These matches
are captured by the [(1   )]iPbk=d+1 pm(jh;ejk)hek terms (for h = 1;    ; d) in (16).
Similarly, some matched individuals will remain in A because their partner refuses to have
a promiscuous match. These high-ej individuals will drift into P as their matches break up,
so long as they survive. The [(1   )]iPdh=1 am(jh;ejk)hek terms (for k = d + 1;    ; b)
represent this situation.
It is readily apparent from (16) that the model will generate rapid transitional dynamics
when  is large or  is small; that is, when matches break up quickly or when teenage life is
short. Last, there is a special case where the number of abstinent and promiscuous matches
jump immediately to their new steady-state values. This is established in the corollary
below. This happens when all the matches discussed in Points 3 and 4 involve mixing
[am(j;ej) = pm(j;ej) = 1=2]. Whether or not this will transpire depends upon parameter
values, etc. This situation occurs in the simulation discussed in Section 9. Note that while at
the aggregate level the number of people engaged in abstinent and promiscuous relationships
is constant over time, at the micro level there is still movement between social classes that
dampens out in line with (16). In this case, at the micro level the ows into and out of the
two social classes balance each other exactly, as is made clear in the proof of the corollary.
Corollary 1 (Instantaneous Aggregate Dynamics) Suppose that for all matched pairs (j;ej)
with j <c and ej >c it is optimal to mix; i.e., assume that am(j;ej) = pm(j;ej) = 1=2 for all
j <c and ej >c. Then, #At =Pdh=1 h and #Pt =Pnh=d+1 h for all t.
Proof. Take all matched pairs of a particular type (j;ej) with j <c and ej >c. By the mixing
condition, half of the matches will be in At, the other half in Pt. Now, every period  of the
surviving matches will breakup in each set. Individuals of type j will go to At+1 while those
of type ej will move to Pt+1. Since for every breakup in At there is one in Pt, the number of
individuals in A and P will not change over time.
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Return now to the issue under study, the rise in premarital sex over the last century. In
order to analyze this issue something must be inputted into the simulation for the time path
of costs that governs premarital sex, fctg1t=1. Turn to this subject now.
7 Technological Progress in Contraception
In 1900 engaging in premarital sex was a very risky business. Roughly 71 percent of females
would have gotten pregnant (had they engaged in sex for a year at normal frequencies).
These odds had dropped to 28 percent by 2002. The reduction in the chance of pregnancy
occurred for two reasons: technological improvement in contraceptives, and the dissemina-
tion of knowledge about contraception and reproduction.
7.1 A Brief History
Coitus interruptus has been practiced since ancient times, and is mentioned in the Bible.8
This was the most important method of contraception historically. The condom has a long
history. In the 18th century, Casanova reported using the English riding coat.Handbills
were circulated in England advertising condoms. One said [for a picture see Himes (1963, p.
198)]:
To guard yourself from shame or fear,
Votaries to Venus, haften here;
None in my wares ever found a aw,
Self preservations natures law.
Early condoms were used more to prevent venereal disease than pregnancy. They were
expensive and uncomfortable. The di¤usion of condoms was promoted by the vulcanization
of rubber in 1843-1844. They were still expensive in 1850, selling for $5 a dozen [McLaren
(1990, p. 184)], which translates into $34 a dozen relative to todays real wages. So, even
when washed and reused, they were too expensive for the masses to use. Another major
innovation was the introduction of the latex condom in the 1930s, which dramatically reduced
cost and increased quality. Other methods of birth control were also used, such as a variety
8 This history is compiled from Himes (1964), McLaren (1990), and Potts and Campbell (2002).
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of intrauterine devices. Casanova mentions using half of a lemon as a contraceptive device.
This could have been quite e¤ective since it acted as barrier-cum-spermicidal agent. In 1797
Bentham advocated the use of the sponge to keep down the size of the poor population.
The rubber diaphragm entered service around 1890. It was expensive and had to be t by
a doctor. This limited its use to those who were relatively well o¤. The pill emblematizes
modern contraception. In 1960 the Food and Drug Administration approved the use of it,
which was a remarkable scientic achievement involving the synthesis of a hormone designed
to fool the reproductive system.
The dissemination of knowledge about contraception and reproduction was also very im-
portant. Scientic knowledge about reproduction began to arise in the 19th century. Van
Baer discovered mammalian ovum in 1827. Around the same time, the birth control move-
ment in America started with the works of Robert Dale Owen and Dr. Charles Knowlton.
Owen published the rst book on birth control, Moral Physiology, in 1830. He suggested
coitus interruptus as the best means of contraception. In 1833 Knowlton published Fruits
of Philosophy, which ultimately had more inuence. He advocated douching since there is
(n)o doubt a very small quantity of semen lodged anywhere within the vagina or within
the vulva, may cause conception, if it should escape the inuence of cold, or some chemical
agentas quoted by Himes (1963, p. 228). He gave some rough prescriptions for douching
agents. Knowlton was prosecuted for obscenity. Scientic knowledge continued to progress,
with Newport describing the fertility cycle of frogs in 1853. In 1873 a law was passed under
the urging of Anthony Comstock banning the communication, via mail, of any information
about contraception or abortion. The next year the U.S. Post O¢ ce seized 60,000 rubber
articles and 3,000 boxes of pills.
The modern birth control movement started about 1914 when Margaret Sanger pub-
lished a pamphlet, Family Limitation, for which she was prosecuted. It described the use
of condoms, douching and suppositories. She became a tireless crusader for birth control
clinics. She opened the rst clinic in 1919. Nine days later the police came. The rst
continually e¤ective birth control clinic was operational in 1923, according to Himes (1963).
21
Sanger promoted the use of the diaphragm through the clinics. Human ovum were seen for
the rst time in 1930. An accurate tracking of the ovulaton cycle was also attained in the
1930s, making the safe period method a little safer. At more than 70 years of age, Sanger
persuaded a wealthy philanthropist in 1952 to donate $116,000 toward the development of
the pill.
7.2 The E¤ectiveness and Use of Contraception
The use of various methods of contraception during premarital intercourse with a rst part-
ner, and their e¢ cacies are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The data for contraceptive use during
rst premarital intercourse starts in the early 1960s. Between 1960 and 2002 the number
of people not using any birth control fell by a remarkable 40 percentage points. The in-
creased use of contraception may derive from two factors. First, technological improvement
has made them both e¤ective and easy to use. As more and more teenagers engage in sex
on this account, one would see an increase in their use. Second, the di¤usion of contra-
ceptives may be slow, as with any new product. The birth control movement has made
information about contraceptives widely available (in a manner similar to advertising for
other products) and access to them easy. This has greatly sped up their di¤usion. How
much is an open question, for which it would be di¢ cult to provide a quantitative answer.
The condom is the most popular method of birth control and its use has actually increased
over time, notwithstanding the introduction of the birth control pill. Today more than half
of people use condoms for premarital sexual relationships with their rst partner. Accord-
ing to Darroch and Singh (1999), the rise of condom users played a signicant role in the
decline of pregnancies among the teenagers during the 1990s. The increase in the use of
condoms was inuenced by the expansion of formal reproductive health education during
the period. On this, Ku, Sonenstein and Pleck (1992) show that sex education about AIDS,
birth control, and resisting sexual activity is associated with more consistent condom use.
Furthermore, Lindberg, Ku and Sonenstein (2000) report that formal sex education on these
topics expanded signicantly during the 1990s.
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In order to measure the decline in risk associated with premarital sex during the 20th
century, an estimate must be made for both the use and e¤ectiveness of contraception in 1900.
Take the use of contraception in 1900, rst. Set the fraction of non-users in 1900 to the values
observed in 1960-1964 period Table 1. Clearly, this is a conservative assumption since use
has been increasing steadily over time. Himes (1963) provides information on the fraction
of married females who use di¤erent methods in 1930s. Assume that the selection pattern
for contraception by young female users during their rst premarital intercourse was similar
to the pattern selected by married women. If one also assumes that the selection pattern
in 1900 was the same as the one displayed in the 1930s (again a conservative assumption),
contraceptive use at rst premarital intercourse can be constructed for 1900.9
Table 1: Contraception use At First Premarital Intercourse, percent
Method 1900 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-82 83-88 85-89 90-94 95-98 99-02
none 61.4 61.4 54.2 55.6 53.5 46.9 34.6 36.1 29.7 27.2 21.2
pill - 4.2 8.6 12.1 12.8 14.2 12.1 19.7 14.1 15.3 16.0
condom 9.42 21.9 24.0 21.0 22.0 26.7 41.8 36.4 49.9 49.8 51.2
withdrawal 11.19 7.3 9.5 7.3 7.5 8.4 8.9 5.6 3.5 4.9 7.3
other 17.99 5.3 3.7 4.0 4.2 3.8 2.6 2.2 2.8 2.8 4.3
Turn now to the e¤ectiveness of contraception in 1900. A number for e¤ectiveness in 1900
is constructed as follows: First, Kopp (1934) reports a 45 percent failure rate for condoms
and a 59.2 percent failure rate for withdrawal. His numbers are based on pre-clinical use
by married couples who sought advice from the Birth Control Clinical Research Bureau in
New York City between 1925 and 1929. Although it seems quite high, a 45 percent failure
rate for condoms is quite close to other estimates from the same period.10 Why was the
9 The results are almost identical if instead the 1900 values are set to the ones observed in 1960-1964 for
teenage female users. Since the pill was not yet introduced in 1900, for these calculations allocate the small
percentage of females in the pill cell into the othercategory.
10 Tone (2001) cites two scientic studies before the Food and Drug Administration started inspecting
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failure rate for withdrawal so high then as well? The main reason was that partial withdrawal
was considered as e¤ective as complete withdrawal, and despite better scientic evidence this
practice did not change quickly  see Brodie (1994). Second, the other methods that people
used around 1920 were not much more e¤ective, either. Kopp (1934) reports the following
failure rates: douche, 70.6 percent; jelly or suppository, 46.6; lactation, 56.6; pessary 28.1;
sponge, 50, and safe period, 59.7. Hence, it is safe to presume that the failure rate for other
methods at the time was no more than 50 percent. Finally, following Hatcher et al. (1976,
1980, 1984, 1988, 1998, and 2004) assume that using no method, and simply taking your
chances, had an 85 percent failure rate.
Since the 1960s evidence on the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent contraceptives, for both their
ideal and typical use, is quite systematic. From that time on failure rates have been measured
as the percentage of women who become pregnant during the rst year of use. By contrast,
the statistics from earlier studies, such as Kopp (1934), are based on married women who
used birth control clinics. First, based on several studies from the early 1960s, Tietze (1970)
reports a 10 to 20 percent failure rate for condoms. According to Hatcher et al. (1976,
1980, 1984, 1988, 1998, and 2004), the failure rates for condoms were pretty constant at 15
to 20 percent during the 1970s and early 1980s, and then declined to about 11 percent in
the mid 1980s. Somewhat mysteriously, they rose slightly in the 1990s. Hence, the condoms
failure rate has fallen from 45 to 14.5 percent, a (continuously compounded) decline of
about 113 percent, both due to technological improvement and increased knowledge about
its appropriate use.
Second, as can be seen in Table 2, the pill is the most e¤ective method of contraception.
It was introduced in the 1960s. Its initial failure rates were about 5 to 10 percent. They
declined to 3.35 percent by 1989, again due to both technological improvement and better
education about its use. Again, the failure rate rose slightly during the 1990s. Third,
even the e¤ectiveness of withdrawal has increased over time; this shows the importance of
education. Finally, during this period the e¤ectiveness of other methods improved as well.
condoms in the late 1930s. One of these studies from 1924 reports a 50 percent failure rate, while a later
one from 1934-35 reports a 41 percent failure rate.
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New and much more e¤ective methods, such as injections and implants, were introduced in
the 1990s.
Table 2: Effectiveness of Contraception (annual failure rates, percent)
Method 1900 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-82 83-88 85-89 90-94 95-98 99-02
none 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0
pill 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 3.4 3.4 5.5 5.5 5.5
condom 45.0 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 11.0 11.0 14.5 14.5 14.5
withdrawal 59.2 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 23.0 23.0
other 50.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
So what is the upshot of this analysis? By combining the information on the e¤ectiveness
and use of contraceptives contained in Tables 1 and 2, one can get a measure of the extent
of technological innovation in birth control. To do this, for each year take an average over
the e¤ectiveness of each method of birth control listed in Table 2. When doing this weight
each practice by its yearly frequency of use, shown in Table 1. The upshot of this calculation
is illustrated (by the line marked Data) in the right panel of Figure 4, which presents the
riskiness of premarital sex. Even when using conservative estimates for 1900, this riskiness
has fallen by (a continuously compounded) 94 percent, from about 72 percent in 1900 to 28
percent in 2002. Now, the series shown in Figure 4 has an important endogenous component
in it, specically the choice of contraceptive used.
Why individuals would choose to use one method over another is not modelled in the
analysis. Doing so could be di¢ cult, and the benet questionable. The same issue also
arises for the conventionally measured aggregate total factor productivity series used by
macroeconomists, although it is not as transparent and perhaps is less problematic. This
series e¤ectively constructs total factor productivity across plants using a Divisia index. Of
course the technology used by any particular plant is an endogenous variable, and there is a
large variance in the technological practice adopted across plants. The important thing to
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note is that the data used for constructing the risk of pregnancy reported in Figure 4 are
conditioned upon an individual having sex. Hence, the data used are not directly a¤ected by
the decision to have sex or not, which is the margin under study. That is, the series plotted
shows the average failure rate over time conditioned upon a person deciding to engage in
premarital sex.
8 Calibration
Prior to simulating the model, values must be assigned to the various parameters governing
tastes, the matching technology, and the type distribution. Towards this end, set up the
type distribution, J(j), so that it approximates a truncated normal, where the truncation
points are 2.5 standard deviations on either side of the mean. An evenly spaced grid of 300
points is used for J . Hence, J(j) will be governed by two parameters, namely its mean, j,
and standard deviation, &j. Given this, there are 8 parameters to pick: , , , , u, w, j,
and &j. This is done in the following manner:11
1. Matching parameters, ,  and . In 2002 roughly 34.4 percent of teenagers between
the ages of 15 and 19 had coitus within the last 3 months.12 Adolescent relationships
are pretty short. On average a teens rst sexual relationship lasts for almost 6 months.
The median duration of an adolescent relationship is about 13 months.13 Construct a
simple Markov chain to match these two facts. Let teenagers match with probably 
and breakup with probability . Given the short duration of teenage relationships, take
the model period to be a quarter. This implies that there will be 20 periods of teenage
11 The model is an innite horizon framework. The real world is made up of nitely-lived overlapping
generations. Every year a new generation of young people enters into the dating world for the rst time,
while members of older cohorts exit due to marriage. This mismatch between the data and the model
appears to be second order, as the results in Section 9 will show.
12 This number is taken from Abma et al. (2004, Table 4, p. 19).
13 Sources: Ryan, Manlove, and Kerry (2003) and Udry and Bearman (1998). According to Udry and
Bearman (1998), the median duration is about 10 months when the respondent is a male and about 13
months when the respondent is a female. The latter is taken here, although the results are very similar if
instead a duration of 10 months is targeted.
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life between the ages of 15 and 19, inclusive. The mean duration of a relationship is
given by 1=. Thus, let 1= = 13=3 so that  = 0:231. This high destruction rate
speaks for relatively fast transitional dynamics, in light of Lemma 3. Next, choose a
value for  so that the statistical mechanics of the (; )-matching technology imply
that on average a teenager will be sexually active 34.4 percent of time between ages
15 and 19. Assume that a teenager starts o¤ unmatched at the end of his/her 14th
year. Let i represent the odds of a teenager being matched i periods down the road.
Thus, 1  i is the probability of being unmatched then. These odds are given by
(17)
24 i
1  i
35 =
24 1   
 1  
35i 24 0
1
35 ; for i = 1;    ; 20.
The fraction of a promiscuous teenagers life spent in a sexually active relationship is
then
P20
i=1 i=20. Therefore, pick  so that 0:75 
P20
i=1 i=20 = 0:344, where it will
be assumed that 75 percent of the 2002 population is sexually active see below. This
results in  = 0:222. Last, a twenty-period teenage life dictates setting  = 1  1=20.
2. Type distribution parameters, j and &j. Now, in 1900 only 6 percent of unmarried
teenage girls engaged in premarital sex. This had risen to 75 percent by 2002. The
model is solved for two steady states. The rst one mimics the year 1900. For this
one, set c = c1900 = 0:2729, which is the quarterly failure rate for 1900. The second
steady state matches the year 2002. Here, pick c = c2002 = 0:0802.14 Last, the
mean and standard deviation, j and &j, are specied so that in the rst steady state
6 percent of people engage in premarital sex, while in the second 75 percent do. Note
that for the model, the probability of a person nding a mate in their teenage years
is given by   1   (1   )(1   )=[1   (1   )]. Hence, equations (13) and (14)
should be solved while setting  #P1900 = 0:06 and  #P2002 = 0:75. The result
is j = 0:1450 and &j = 0:0857. Lemma 1 implies that in a steady state the number
14 According to the calculations in Section 7.2, the risk of pregnancy was 0.7205 per year in 1900 and
0.2843 per year in 2002. If the probability of pregnancy over a year is bc, then take the quarterly probability,
c, to be given by c = 1  (1  bc)(1=4).
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of people in A and P depends solely on the cost of sex, c, and the shape of the J(j)
distribution, as governed here by j and &j. Therefore, for given values of c,  and ,
the above procedure solves the two steady-state equations determining the number of
people engaged in premarital sex for the two unknowns j and &j. Given the setup of
the model, there does not seem to be another so-natural criteria for choosing j and &j.
Especially because statistics describing the properties of matching within a class, such
as the average number of partners for a sexually active person, do not depend upon
the shape of the J(j) distribution, as was mentioned in Section 5.
3. Taste parameters, , u, and w. Given that a period is one quarter, set  = 0:99.
In the simulation the values chosen for u and w dont matter very much. In fact,
theoretically they dont a¤ect the steady state at all, as Lemma 1 makes clear. In light
of this, simply set u   w = 1 and let w = jminfj1; 0gj + c1900. The latter restriction
ensures that lifetime utility is always positive.15
The model is now ready to be simulated.
9 Social Change: The Computational Experiment
Go back in time to 1900. Premarital sex is dangerous, since a young woman runs a 72
percent risk of pregnancy. Given this, the vast majority of youth chose to live abstinent
lifestyles. Sex is a taboo subject. All of this is about to change due to technological progress
in contraception. Over time the risk of pregnancy declines. This changes the cost and
benet calculation of engaging in premarital sex. Slowly more and more people engage in
premarital sex so that by 2002 a substantial majority of teens are experiencing it. Can the
model capture this pattern of social change?
To answer this question, start the model economy o¤ in a steady state resembling the
situation in 1900. Then, subject it to the time path of technological progress for contra-
15 This restriction is not needed for the theory and does not impact on the numerical results. It is imposed
because the programming language used has some very fast built-in commands that can be employed when
the matrices in the analysis are positive.
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ception that is observed in the data from 1900 to 2002, as calculated in Section 7.2. When
doing this assume for simplicity that there is no technological advance in contraception after
2002. Given this the economy will eventually converge to a situation resembling 2002, given
Point 2 in Section 8. Now, calculate the resulting time path for the type distributions in the
abstinent and promiscuous classes for the model economy. Does the resulting time path for
teenagers engaging in premarital sex resemble the pattern observed in the U.S. data? That
is the question.
9.1 2002 Steady State
To glean some insight into the models mechanics, focus for a moment on the matching set
that obtains in the nal steady state. This is portrayed in Figure 3. The horizontal axes
simply plot j and ej pairs, or the types for the potential match (where 1 is the lowest index
for type, and 300 the highest). The varying heights on the vertical axis denote di¤erent
matching situations. For instance, the trough in the front reects the situation where both
typesrst choice is an abstinent match. The adjacent block on the left reports a mixing
situation [am(j;ej) = pm(j;ej) = 1=2]. Here j would prefer an abstinent match and ej a
promiscuous one. Half of the matches in this zone will be abstinent, and the other half
promiscuous. The other adjacent block on the right reects the same situation with the
positions of j and ej reversed. These matches were discussed in Points 3 and 4 of Section 6.1.
Hence, they wont occur in steady state, since all j < c will be in A and all j > c will be in
P. Since in the gure only mixing situations occur when couples have di¤ering views on the
desirability of sex, the corollary to Lemma 3 suggests that the models transitional dynamics
will be rapid. This turns out to be true. Now, move to the large area in the corner at the
back of the gure. This block gives the (j;ej) combinations where a promiscuous match is the
rst choice of both individuals. Note that according to Figure 3, no agent rejects a match;
i.e., the blocks exhaust the type space. This result is sensitive to the values of c,  and
. Promiscuity is more costly the higher is c. A match becomes more valuable, relative to
searching, as  and  fall. When  is low it is hard to nd a mate, and when  is small the
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Figure 3: Matching set, nal steady state
benets from a relationship are enduring. Therefore, when both  and  are low an agent is
reluctant to decline a potential partner.
9.2 Transitional Dynamics
Now, turn to the transitional dynamics. As can be seen from the left panel of Figure 4, the
model (marked Baseline) has little trouble replicating the rapid rise in premarital sex over
the last century. Indeed, Lemma 3 suggests the number of people engaging in premarital sex
will response quickly to declines in the cost of sex. Furthermore, given the matching patterns
exhibited in Figure 3, the corollary hints that reaction could be instantaneous. Note that
the model gives a S-shaped di¤usion pattern for the increase in premarital sex, a pattern
also visible in data. This is characteristic of technological adoption, here contraceptives.16
Observe that the sharpest rate of increase in premarital sex, for both the model and the
16 Some economic factors that underlie the S-shaped di¤usion patterns associated with the adoption of new
technologies are studied in Andolfatto and MacDonald (1998), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), Manuelli
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Figure 4: (i) Rise in premarital sex, U.S. data and the model with and without abortion (left
panel). (ii) Expected cost of premarital sex (right panel). The line marked Dataplots the
expected risk of pregnancy (annualized, %) given the e¤ectiveness and use of contraception.
The other line shows the expected cost of premarital sex given the availability of abortion.
data, occurs when the drop in the risk of pregnancy is most precipitous (i.e., after 1960).
Premarital sex rises faster in the data than in the model, however. This could be due to
missing factors, such as the legalization of abortion, introduced in the next section. Still,
its surprising how far the analysis can go without such considerations.
9.3 Abortion
In 1973 the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law that criminalized abortion except when
the life of the mother was in jeopardy. The ruling e¤ectively provided free access to abortion
in the United States. The number of abortions immediately rose, as the right panel of Figure
5 illustrates. About 56 percent of pregnancies were terminated in 1979. One of the e¤ects
of the legalization of abortion was undoubtedly to reduce the cost of premarital sex.
The e¤ects of the liberalization of abortion laws will now be incorporated into the analy-
and Seshadri (2004), and Mukoyama (2006).
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sis. To this end, let  a represent the cost of an abortion and  b denote the cost of an
out-of-wedlock birth. The odds of becoming pregnant for a girl engaging in premarital sex
are represented by . Some fraction  of these girls will terminate their pregnancies, while
the fraction 1    will bear the child. Given this notation, the expected cost of premarital
sex, c, can therefore be written as
c =  a +  b(1  ):
Without loss of generality, normalize  b = 1.
The parameter  a will be picked so that the model does the best possible job in explaining
the trend toward premarital sex. The numbers  and  are taken from the data. The
probability of becoming pregnant, , is given by the failure rates calculated above. The time
series for the fraction of pregnancies terminated in an abortion, , is presented in Figure
5, right panel. The empirical procedure picks  a = 0:0853, so an abortion is much less
costly than an out-of-wedlock birth. Figure 4, left panel, shows the t. The procedure
now picks j = 0:1278 and &j = 0:0972: As can be seen, the model does much better once
abortion is allowed for. Observe that the risk associated with premarital sex declines rapidly
after 1973 due to the legalization of abortion. As a consequence, the number of young
females experiencing premarital sex increases more rapidly than in the baseline model. As
the number of abortions decline after its peak in 1980, the trend toward premarital sex is
dampened vis à vis the baseline model. In particular, note the downward dip in sexual
activity that occurs in the model as the risk of sex rises in the mid 1980sin contrast, the
baseline model displays a monotonic rise.17
Finally, between 1900 and 1970 the number of teenage girls who had experienced premar-
ital sex rose from 6 to 51 percent. The 1973 Roe v. Wade decision cannot explain any of this
rise. The model (tted with abortion) predicts that 34 percent of girls would have engaged
17 The cost structure can be further modied to include the cost associated with HIV/AIDS
c =  a +  b(1  ) +  h;
where  h is the cost of contracting HIV and  is the probability of contracting HIV in a sexual relationship.
This extension did not signicantly improve the models performance.
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in premarital sex in 1970. In 1990 about 72 percent of 19-year-old girls had experienced
premarital sex. The model tted with abortion can be used to make a prediction about this.
It forecasts that 66 percent of teenage girls would have had premarital sex when abortion is
freely available, versus 51 percent when it isnt ( = 0). Therefore, abortion explains roughly
23 percent of the predicted value of premarital sex for 1990, or 25 percent of the predicted
rise.
9.3.1 Pregnancies
The model generates a prediction on how many teenage girls will get pregnant each period.
Figure 5, left panel, shows the percentage of girls who become pregnant, both in the data
and the model. The total number of pregnancies in the data is calculated as the sum of
births, abortions and miscarriages for unmarried females between ages 15 and 19the exact
details are provided in the Appendix. Pregnancies for the model economy are calculated
as follows: Let mt denote the fraction of females who are having sex in period t and let ct
be the expected cost of premarital sex. Assume that if a girl is pregnant in a given period,
she cannot get pregnant again (whether or not the pregnancy was terminated through an
abortion) during the following two model periods (six months). These girls can still have sex
as long as they are matched, but are not counted as a part of the risk pool for the pregnancy
calculations. Then, an adjusted value, mat , for the fraction of women having sex at time t
who are at risk for pregnancy can be calculated as
mat = mt  mt 1pt 1(1  ) mt 2pt 2(1  )(1  ) mt 2pt 2:
The yearly pregnancy numbers in Figure 5 are constructed simply as mat [(1  (1  ct)4]: The
model performs well in generating the right level of pregnancies. In particular, it predicts a
rise and decline in the number of pregnancies, the same pattern that is observed in the data.
9.3.2 The Power of the Pill
The rise in premarital sex is often associated with the invention of the birth control pill.
The model can be used to assess this claim. In particular, one can run the counterfactual
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Figure 5: (i) Increase in teenage pregnancies, U.S. data and model (left panel); (ii) The
prevalence of abortion in the U.S. (right panel)
experiment where no pill is invented. The rst step in the experiment is to calculate the
risk of premarital sex without the pill. This is easy to do using the information provided
in Tables 1 and 2. Specically, allocate birth control pill users across the other method of
contraceptions, including withdrawal, according to their frequency of use. After having done
this, construct a new series for the risk of pregnancy in the same manner as before. Rerun
the simulations using this new series.18 The upshot of the experiment is shown in Figure
6. As can be seen, the invention of the birth control pill contributed very little to the rise in
premarital sex among teenagers. For example, in 2002 it accounted for 1 percentage points
out of the 75 percent of girls who had experienced sex by age 19. The reason is simple.
The pill is not used by a large number of teenage girls, and once this number is allocated
to other methods the overall e¤ects are small. Thus, its introduction did not a¤ect the risk
of pregnancy much. A similar experiment can be conducted for condoms, with pretty much
18 Keep j = 0:1278 and &j = 0:0972:
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Figure 6: The power of the pill
the same result. Thus, no particular contraceptive is responsible for the sexual revolution,
since there were readily available reasonable alternatives.
9.3.3 Cross-Sectional Implications on the Number of Partners
Relationships are governed in the models steady state by a Markov chain structure. Recall
that the probability of a meeting, , and the odds of a breakup, , are chosen so that the
Markov chain (17) generates the fraction of teenage life spent in a relationship and the
observed median duration for one that are observed in the U.S. data. The Markov chain
matching technology also yields predictions on the number of partners that a promiscuous
person will have between the ages of 15 and 19, or across 20 model periods.
In order to calculate the total number of partners per promiscuous agent over 20 model
periods, let mit denote the number of matched agents with i sexual encounters by time t and
uit represent the number of unmatched agents with i sexual encounters. Then, the number
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of matched individuals with i sexual encounters in period t+ 1 is given by
(18) mit+1 = (1  )mit + ui 1t .
In this equation, the fraction (1  ) of matched promiscuous people with i lifetime partners
in period t will remain in their current relationship next period so that these individuals will
still have i partners then, while the proportion  of single agents with i   1 partners will
nd matches and thus have i partners next period. In similar fashion,
(19) uit+1 = (1  )uit + mit:
An upper bound on the maximum number of partners after T periods of matching is N =
T=2 + 1. Thus, equations (18) and (19) dene a Markov chain over fm0t ; u0t ;    ;mNt ; uNt g.
This Markov chain can be simulated for T periods starting from the initial distribution
f0; 1;    ; 0; 0g. It can be used to calculate the mean number of total partners per individual
over T periods see the Appendix, Section 12.3, for more detail.19
In 2002 a sexually active teenage girl had 3.0 partners by age 19. The Markov chains
prediction is 2.5. While the means are close, the data exhibits far more cross-sectional
variation than the Markov chain does as Table 3 shows. As can be seen, in the data far more
girls have just one partner than predicted by the Markov chain for matching. At the same
time, a much larger number of girls have more than 7 partners in the data than is forecasted
by the Markov chain.
TABLE 3: Number of Partners
(Active females by age 19, fraction)
# of Partners 1 2 to 3 4 to 6 7+
Data 0.390 0.306 0.171 0.133
Markov chain 0.1343 0.7205 0.1451 0.0001
19 Note that the Markov chain used in the model is slightly di¤erent from the one t to the U.S. data. In
the real world teenage life lasts a xed number of years, here taken to be the 5 years between 15 and 19,
inclusive. In the model they exit teenage life each period with probability 1  . Recall that  is set so that
teenage life expectancy is 5 years. This does not lead to signicant di¤erence in the two Markov chains
predictions on the number of partners.
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How to model such variety in sexual experience is an interesting issue. One might think
that modelling unfaithfulness (that is simultaneous relationships by a person) is important
here. The fraction of teenagers with multiple partners, however, seems to be quite low.
Abma and Sonenstein (2001), using the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG),
report that only 17.5 percent of teenage girls and 12.8 percent of teenage boys had more
than one partner in the last three months. But, some of these would just be a change in
partners. Hence, the fraction of teenagers with multiple simultaneous partners within a
three months period must be even smaller. In a similar vein, Sonenstein, Pleck, and Ku
(1991, p. 164) also report that (v)ery few of the sexually active respondents in the NSAM
appear to have been involved in simultaneous sexual relationships. Seventy-nine percent of
sexually active young men reported having had no multiple sexual relationships in any of
the last 12 months.They also report that between the 1979 and 1988 waves of NSAM, the
number of partners declined while the level of sexual activity was increasing. Their analysis
uses a di¤erent data set, the National Survey of Adolescent Males (NSAM). Finally, in an
extensive report on teenage sexual behavior, the Alan Guttmacher Institute (1994, p. 24)
reports that (b)ecause of concerns about STDs, especially HIV, health o¢ cials and medical
professionals advise sexually active individuals to have only one partner that is, to be in a
mutually monogamous relationship. Unmarried people, young and old alike, often translate
this advise into serial monogamy.
How can more dispersion in partners be obtained? Cutting the period length can help,
because the length of a period limits the number of partners one can have during your
teenage years. Indeed, some limited experimentation shows that cutting period length from
a quarter to a month allows the model to match the dispersion in the data better.20 It is
20 With a shorter period length the model does a better job in predicting the rst three cells of Table 3.
In particular, the number of girls with just one partner now looks much better. As period length shrinks the
model becomes much more computationally demanding, both in terms of memory and speed. Additionally,
calibrating the model and matching it up with the data is now more of a concern. In particular, one must
think carefully about how to map the high frequency observations from the model with the low frequency
observations from the U.S. data. For example, a smaller number of teenagers will have sex in a month than
in a quarter, and less will have sex in quarter than in a year. So, issues about time aggregation for the model
and in the U.S. data are important.
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still hard to get a substantial number of girls with a large number of partners (7+), though.
One way of doing this may be to allow for heterogeneity in types. That is, perhaps one could
let a small number of individuals have higher values for  and  than others. This could
proxy for the fact that some people like variety in mates. This is the type of extension that
the next generation of models may be able to entertain.
10 The Frequency of Sex: A Proposed Extension
10.1 Facts
As contraceptive technology became more e¤ective, and its use more widespread, one might
expect that the frequency of premarital sex within a promiscuous relationship should rise
also. This is the case. The earliest source on the frequency of sex is Kinsey et al. (1953).
They report a mean frequency of sex for active females between the ages of 16 and 19
of 0.5 times per week, or 7.92 times per quarter Kinsey et al. (1953, Table 76, p. 334).
This classic study is based on female histories collected over the 1938 to 1950 period. Since
the sample consists of women/girls between ages 2 and 71+, the data on premarital sexual
experience provides information for the earlier periods as well. So, presuppose that the
frequency of sex for teenagers with premarital sexual experience was 7.92 times per quarter
in 1900.21
Now, move forward to recent times. Abma et al. (2004, Table 6, p. 21) report frequency
for females aged 15-19 for the year 2002. Table 4 shows some statistics based on their ndings.
As can be seen, the mean monthly frequency for girls with premarital sexual experience was
3.18 times, which translates into a quarterly frequency of 12.71.22 Therefore, the frequency
of sex between practicing partners rose by a factor of 1.6 over the last century. It is also
interesting to note the wide dispersion in the frequency of sex, about which little will be said
here.
21 Unfortunately, the study does not report the frequency of premarital intercourse by birth cohorts.
22 Zelnick, Kanter and Ford (1981, Table 3.7, p. 86) report a mean frequencies of 2.9 and 2.6 for 1971 and
1976. These lie between the Kinsey et al. (1953) and Abma et al. (2004) numbers, as would be expected.
38
TABLE 4: Monthly Frequency of Sex
(Active females, ages 15 to 19)
# of times distribution
0 0.3890
1 0.0945
2 to 3 (= 2.5) 0.1604
4 to 7 (= 5.5) 0.1495
8+ (= 9) 0.2066
Mean = 3.177
10.2 A Framework for Studying Frequency
To model the above facts, change the term in the utility function involving sex to
(20) lnfej exp(f =  =)g = lnej + f =  =; with  < 0 and  > 0;
where f represents the frequency of sex and ej now denotes the joy from it. Let the cost of
sex be given by
(21) ec = 1  pf ,
where p is the odds of having a safe sexual encounter. Observe that 1  pf is the probability
of becoming pregnant, or the failure rate, given the frequency of sex f . The cost function is
increasing and concave in f , since
dec
df
=   (ln p) pf > 0 and d
2ec
(df)2
=   (ln p)2 pf < 0;
where the signs of the above expressions follow from the fact that 0  p  1. Therefore,
while the chances of getting pregnant increase with the frequency of sex, they do so at a
diminishing rate.
Cast an individuals decision regarding the frequency of sex as follows:
max
f
flnej + f =  =  1 + pfg:
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The rst- and second- order conditions for this problem are
(22) f  1 =  (ln p)pf ;
and
(23) (  1)f  2 + (ln p)2pf < 0:
The rst-order condition simply sets the marginal benet from coitus, f  1, equal to its
marginal cost,  (ln p)pf . One might expect the frequency of sex will rise with an improve-
ment in the e¤ectiveness of contraceptives, or a fall in p. Strictly speaking this need not be
the case since the marginal cost of sex is not necessarily decreasing in p.
Lemma 4 The frequency of sex, f , increases or decreases with the e¤ectiveness of contra-
ception, p, depending on whether   ln p S 1=f .
Proof. Di¤erentiating the e¢ ciency condition (22) yields
df
dp
=
 pf 1   (ln p)fpf 1
(  1)f  2 + (ln p)2pf :
The second-order condition (23) implies that the denominator of the above expression is
negative. Next see that  pf 1   (ln p)fpf 1 S 0 as   ln p S 1=f .
Now, for empirically relevant values of p and f it will transpire that df=dp > 0, as will be
clear from the discussion below.
Given the form of (20) the marginal benet from sex does not depend on the persons typeej. This abstraction is unrealistic, yet its simplicity is a big virtue. It allows the framework
for the frequency of sex to be tacked on to the existing apparatus in a very simple manner,
as will be discussed. If type and frequency are allowed to interact then each partner to a
match would have to bargain over frequency, at least if their types di¤ered.
Is the above framework consistent with the observed increase in the frequency of sex?
The answer is yes. The question really amounts to asking whether or not there exits values
for  and  such that the e¢ ciency condition (22) returns the observed frequencies of sex in
1900 and 2002, given the observed probabilities of safe sex in these years. To this end, note
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from (21) that the probability of a safe sexual encounter is given by pt = (1  ect)1=ft, where
the subscript t refers to the time period for a variable. Recall that the quarterly failure
rate of contraception in 1900 was 0.27 and the observed frequency of sex 7.92. Hence, the
probability of a safe sexual encounter in 1900 is given by p1900 = (1  0:2729)1=7:92 = 0:9606.
Likewise, in 2002 the odds of not becoming pregnant were p2002 = (1 0:0543)1=12:71 = 0:9956.
Interestingly, while a single sexual encounter in 2002 looks very safe, having sex 412:71 = 51
times over the course of the year results in a 28.5 percent chance of pregnancy.
Next, it follows from (22) that
(
f2002
f1900
) 1 =
(ln p2002)(p2002)
f2002
(ln p1900)(p1900)f1900
:
This equation can be used to pin down a value for , given observations for f1900, f2002, p1900,
and p2002. Specically,
 = ln

(ln p2002)(p2002)
f2002
(ln p1900)(p1900)f1900

= ln

f2002
f1900

+ 1 =  3:13.
Finally, a value for  can also be backed out from (22). In particular, set
 =
(  ln p1900)(p1900)
(f1900) 1
= 149:39:
To summarize given  =  3:13 and  = 149:39, the above procedure implies that the rst-
order condition (22) will return f = 7:92 when p = 0:9606, and f = 12:71 when p = 0:9956.
The second-order condition (23) also holds when evaluated at the 1900 and 2002 values.
Thus, a maximum obtains notwithstanding the concave cost function.23 With regard to
Lemma 2, observe that once the framework has been calibrated to match the observed (fairly
small) values for f it must transpire that df=dp > 0, since ln p ' 0.
Last, to tack the above framework onto the earlier model simply let lnej = j 2 J =
fj1; j2;    ; jng and c =  f = + = + ec. Hence, the cost of sex in Section 2 must now
incorporate into it the utility derived from the optimal frequency of sex. Transforming the
23 Also, note that f =   =   (1   p)f > 0 for both 1900 and 2002 so that an individual is obtaining
positive utility from the frequency of sex. This consideration is important for deciding which matches to
accept or reject, or which social class to join.
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type distribution in this way and following the procedure mentioned in Section 8, Point 2,
results in j =  47:6261 and &j = 0:1226.
11 Conclusions
What causes social change? The idea here is that a large part of social change is a reaction to
technological progress in the economy. Technological progress a¤ects societys consumption
and production possibilities. It therefore changes individualsincentives to abide by social
customs and mores. As people gradually change their behavior to take advantage of emerging
opportunities, custom (an aggregation of individual behavior) slowly evolves too.
This notion is applied here to the rocket-like rise in premarital sex that occurred over
the last century. Now, a majority of youth engage in premarital sex. One hundred years
ago almost none did. This is traced here to the dramatic decline in the expected cost of
premarital sex, due technological improvement in contraceptives and their increased avail-
ability. This is modeled within the context of an equilibrium matching model. The model
has two key ingredients. First, individuals weigh the cost and benet of coitus when engag-
ing in premarital sexual activity. Second, they associate with individuals who share their
own proclivities. Such a model mimics well the observed rise in premarital sexual activity,
given the observed decline in the risk of sex.
Improvement in contraceptive technology may also partially explain the decline in the
fraction of life spent married for a female from 0.88 in 1950 to 0.60 in 1995.24 This is due to
delays in rst marriages and remarriages, and a rise in divorce. Historically, the institution
of marriage was a mechanism to have safe sex, among other things. As sex became safer,
the need for marriage declined on this account. According to Becker (1991, p. 326):
Since the best way to learn about someone else is by being together, intensive
search is more e¤ective when unwed couples spend considerable time together,
perhaps including trial marriages. Yet when contraceptives are crude and un-
reliable, trial marriages and other premarital contact greatly raise the risk of
pregnancy. The signicant increase during this century in the frequency of trial
24 This fact is taken from Greenwood and Guner (2009), and is analyzed from a di¤erent perspective there.
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marriages and other premarital contact has been in part a rational response to
major improvements in contraceptive techniques, and is not decisive evidence
that young people now value sexual experiences more than they did in the past.
An interesting avenue for future research might be to investigate the implications of the
contraceptive revolution for marriage and divorce.25 26
12 Appendix
12.1 Lemmas
12.1.1 Lemma 1
Proof. Conjecture a solution for the decision rules and value functions in steady state.
Specically, assume that:
(i) 1a(j;ej) = 2a;s(j;ej) = 1a;ps (j) = 1 and 1p(j;ej) = 0 for all j;ej 2 A,
(ii) 1a(j;ej) = 1a;ps (j) = 0 and 1p(j;ej) = 2p;s(j;ej) = 1 for all j;ej 2 P,
(iii) Am(j;ej) = Am(j), where Am(j) is a function, for all j;ej 2 A,
(iv) Pm(j;ej) = Pm(j), where Pm(j) is a function, for all j;ej 2 P.
This conjectured solution will now be veried.
To begin with, establish that there is no incentive for a matched couple in A to switch
to P, or vice versa. To this end, subtract (1) from (3) to obtain Pm(j;ej) Am(j;ej) = j  c.
Clearly, Pm(j;ej) Am(j;ej) R 0 as j R c. Thus, there is no gain for a matched couple (j;ej)
2 P or another one (j;ej) 2 A to switch from their respective social classes.
Now, (i) and (ii) imply that am(j;ej) = 1 and pm(j;ej) = 0 for (j;ej) 2 A, and am(j;ej) = 0
and pm(j;ej) = 1 for (j;ej) 2 P. Given (i), (ii), and (iii) when (j;ej) 2 A equations (1) and
25 Interestingly, Choo and Siow (2006) estimate, using an non-transferable utility model of the U.S.
marriage market, that the gains for marriage accruing to young adults fell sharply between 1971 and 1981.
26 The introduction of infant formula is another example of a small invention having a large impact
on household activity. Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) argue that this promoted labor-force participation by
married women (in addition to advances in pediatric and obstetric medicine). It could also impact on
marriage and divorce.
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(2) can be represented by
Am(j) = u+ (1  )Am(j) + As(j);
and
As(j) = w + Am(j) + (1  )As(j):
Clearly, when (j;ej) 2 A then Am(j;ej) is no longer a function of ej. This occurs because ej
will always desire to remain matched with j and vice versa. Direct calculation reveals that
(24) Am(j) =
[1  (1  )]u+ w

;
and
(25) As(j) =
[1  (1  )]w + u

;
where   (1  ) [1   (1      )] > 0. Thus, point (iii) has been shown. For future
reference, let an asterisk attached to a function signify its closed-form solution in a steady
state, dened only over the equilibrium set of agents that live in the relevant social class.
Observe that Am(j) > As(j), as was conjectured, because u > w.
Likewise, for (j;ej) 2 P note that equations (3) and (4) can then be rewritten as
Pm(j) = u+ j   c+ (1  )Pm(j) + P s(j);
and
P s(j) = w + Pm(j) + (1  )P s(j):
The solutions to these two equations are given by
(26) Pm(j) =
(u+ j   c)[1  (1  )] + w

;
and
(27) P s(j) =
[1  (1  )]w + (u+ j   c)

:
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It is easy to see that
Pm(j)  P s(j) = (u+ j   c  w)(1  )

:
Thus, Pm(j) > P s(j) when u + j   c > w, which will hold for all j > c. Therefore, point
(iv) has been established.
Conditions (i) to (iv) imply that P s(j) < As(j) for j 2 A and P s(j) > As(j) for j 2 P.
First, note that in the conjectured steady state asi = 0 for all i > b and p
s
i = 0 for all i < b.
Using this observation, subtract (2) from (4) in steady state to get
P s(j)  As(j) = 
nX
i=b+1
psi [a
m(j;eji)Am(j;eji) + pm(j;eji)Pm(j;eji)]
 
bX
i=1
asi [a
m(j;eji)Am(j;eji) + pm(j;eji)Pm(j;eji)]
+f(1  ) + 
nX
i=b+1
psi [1  am(j;eji)  pm(j;eji)]gf1a;ps (j)As(j) + [1  1a;ps (j)]P s(j)g
 f(1  ) + 
bX
i=1
asi [1  am(j;eji)  pm(j;eji)]gf1a;ps (j)As(j) + [1  1a;ps (j)]P s(j)g:
For j 2 P (which implies j > c) it is easy to see that
P s(j)  As(j) = 
nX
i=b+1
psiP
m(j;eji)   bX
i=1
asi [a
m(j;eji)Am(j;eji) + pm(j;eji)Pm(j;eji)]
+(1  )P s(j)  f(1  ) + 
bX
i=0
asi [1  am(j;eji)  pm(j;eji)]gP s(j)
> Pm(j)  
bX
i=1
asi [a
m(j;eji) + pm(j;eji)]Pm(j;eji)
 
bX
i=1
asi [1  am(j;eji)  pm(j;eji)]Pm(j;eji)
= Pm(j)  
bX
i=1
asiP
m(j;eji) > 0
The rst inequality relies on the facts that Pm(j;eji) > Am(j;eji) and Pm(j;eji) > P s(j) for
j 2 P. The latter fact is intuitive. Surely, a promiscuous type would prefer to have sex now
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and search for another partner later as opposed to searching now and having sex later. It
is straightforward to establish. The last inequality employs the fact that Pm(j) > Pm(j;eji)
for eji 2 A. Again this is appealing. A promiscuous type should prefer a partner whose type
also lies in P. This, too, is not di¢ cult to prove. Thus, no unmatched j 2 P would want to
switch. A similar argument can be made for j 2 A.
It is easy to deduce that the above facts established about the value functions support
the conjectured decision rules in (i) and (ii).
12.1.2 Lemma 3
Proof. The proof proceeds using the guess-and-verify strategy. To this end, suppose that
the value functions Am(j;ej), As(j), Pm(j;ej), and P s(j) immediately jump to their new
steady-state values upon the once-and-all decline in c. Now, consider a pair in the situation
described by Point 1 in Section 6.1. The relevant payo¤s for j when matched with ej, for
j;ej 2 fjd+1;    ; jng, will be given by (26) and (27). Note that when this match breaks up
person j will not have to worry about subsequently matching in P with a ej 2 fj1;    ; jdg,
given Point 2. Thus, from their own limited perspective, these agents will be immediately
jumping into the new steady state since they will never have to mix with a type in the set
fj1;    ; jdg. Next, focus upon those individuals in the situation outlined by Point 2. Their
payo¤s will again be described by (26) and (27). Again, if they switch to P they will not
have to worry about matching next period with a ej 2 fj1;    ; jdg. So, from their viewpoint,
these agents will be immediately moving into the new steady-state situation in P. (The
optimality of the steady state from an individuals perspective is detailed in the proof of
Lemma 1.)
Now, move to Point 3. Let j 2 fj1;    ; jdg and ej 2 fjd+1;    ; jbg. For it to be op-
timal for j to be matched with ej in this situation in A it must transpire that Am(j;ej) >
maxfAs(j); P s(j)g and Pm(j;ej) < maxfAm(j;ej); As(j); P s(j)g. First, by subtracting (1)
from (3) it can be seen that Pm(j;ej)   Am(j;ej) = j   c R 0 as j R c. Therefore, js rst
choice is a match in A, while ejs would be one in P. Now, there are two cases to consider
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for j. Either she is in a mixing situation with ej [implying 2p;s(j;ej) = 1] or she is refusing a
promiscuous match all together [2p;s(j;ej) = 0]. Take the latter situation rst. The conjec-
ture is that todays value functions will immediately jump to their steady-state values and
remain there. This would imply that 1a;ps (j;ej) = 1, am(j;ej) = 1, pm(j;ej) = 0. Using this on
the righthand sides of (1) and (2) and solving for Am(j;ej) and As(j) results in
Am(j;ej) = Am(j); [for j  jd < jd+1  ej and am(j;ej) = 1]
and
As(j) = As(j); (for j  jd),
where Am(j) and As(j) are specied by (24) and (25). Imposing this conjecture on (4)
leads to
P s(j) = w + 
nX
k=d+1
psk[a
m(j;ejk)Am(j;ejk) + pm(j;ejk)Pm(j;ejk)]
+(1  )As(j)
< As(j) < Am(j) (for j  jd < jd+1  ej):
Thus, j will remain happy with her lot in A, so there is no need to change her strategy
today, taking as given ejs strategy.
Next, consider the mixing situation for j. Here, the solution for Am(j;ej) reads
Am(j;ej) = u+ (1  )(j   c)=2 + As(j)
1  (1  ) < A
m(j) [for j  jd < ej and am(j;ej) = 1=2]:
For j to agree to a mixing situation it must transpire that Am(j;ej) > As(j). Observe that
Am(j;ej) is increasing in j. Thus, mixing cannot occur for any j < jp where p = argmax
i
fi :
Am(ji;ej) < As(ji)g. When j > jp, there will be no incentive for j to switch strategies.
Now, move to person ej. For ej to be matched with j it must happen that Am(ej; j) >
maxfAs(ej); P s(ej)g. Person ej may nd himself in one of two situations: either a mixing
situation or one where j will refuse a promiscuous match. In the former 2p;s(j;ej) = 1, while
in the latter 2p;s(j;ej) = 0. Take the latter case and suppose that the steady-state solution
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holds true at some point in time. Here, am(j;ej) = 1 and pm(j;ej) = 0. It is then easy to
deduce that Am(ej; j) and As(ej) are given by
Am(ej; j) = u+ (1  )Am(ej; j) + P s(ej)
=
u+ P s(ej)
1  (1  ) > A
m(ej) [for j  jd < jd+1  ej and am(j;ej) = 1];
and
As(ej) = w +  dX
h=1
ash[a
m(ej; jh)Am(ej; jh) + pm(ej; jh)Pm(ej; jh)]
+(1  )P s(ej)
< P s(ej) < Pm(ej) (for jd+1  ej).
[Note that Pm(ej; jh) > Am(ej; jh) for ej and 0  am(ej; jh)+pm(ej; jh)  1:] Now, an abstinent
match cannot occur for any ej > jq where q = argmax
i
fi : Am(eji; j) > P s(eji)g. When this
is true, there is no incentive for ej to shift from the conjectured strategy. Similarly, it is
straightforward to calculate that when there is mixing
Am(ej; j) = u+ (1  )(ej   c)=2 + P s(ej)
1  (1  ) > A
m(ej) [for j  jd < jd+1  ej and am(j;ej) = 1=2]:
As can be seen, mixing will yield ej a higher level of utility than a purely abstinent match
when ej > c. Mixing cannot occur for any ej > jr where r = argmax
i
fi : Am(eji; j) > P s(eji)g.
Individual ej will have no incentive to deviate from the conjectured strategy when this is
true.
The situations described in Points 4 and 5 can be similarly analyzed. The reader is
spared the details.
12.2 Laws of Motion for the Type Distributions
Recall that the distributionsMa; Sa; Mp and Spare nonnormalized. Let  Pnh=1Pni=1Ma(jh;eji)
represent the number of attached agents inA, while similarly  Pnh=1 Sa(jh) is the number
of unattached ones. Likewise, the number of unattached people in P reads # Pnh=1 Sp(jh).
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The laws of motion for Ma(j;ej), Sa(j), Mp(j;ej) and Sp(j), which dene the operator (12),
are given by
Ma0(j;ej) = (1  )am(j;ej)Ma(j;ej) + (1  )am(j;ej)Mp(j;ej)(28)
+ am(j;ej)Sa(j)Sa(ej)=2 + #am(j;ej)Sp(j)Sp(ej)=#2;
Sa0(j) = (1  )1a;ps (j)Sa(j) + (1  )1a;ps (j)Sp(j) + (1  )1a;ps (j)J(j)(29)
+ 
X
m
1a;ps (j)[1  am(j;ejm)  pm(j;ejm)]Sa(j)Sa(ejm)=2
+ 
X
m
#1a;ps (j)[1  am(j;ejm)  pm(j;ejm)]Sp(j)Sp(ejm)=#2
+ 
X
m
1a;ps (j)f + (1  )[1  am(j;ejm)  pm(j;ejm)]gMa(j;ejm)
+ 
X
m
1a;ps (j)f + (1  )[1  am(j;ejm)  pm(j;ejm)]gMp(j;ejm);
Sp0(j) = (1  )[1  1a;ps (j)]Sa(j) + (1  )[1  1a;ps (j)]Sp(j) + (1  )[1  1a;ps (j)]J(j)
(30)
+ 
X
m
[1  1a;ps (j)][1  am(j;ejm)  pm(j;ejm)]Sa(j)Sa(ejm)=2
+ 
X
m
#[1  1a;ps (j)][1  am(j;ejm)  pm(j;ejm)]Sp(j)Sp(ejm)=#2
+ 
X
m
[1  1a;ps (j)]f + (1  )[1  am(j;ejm)  pm(j;ejm)]gMa(j;ejm)
+ 
X
m
[1  1a;ps (j)]f + (1  )[1  am(j;ejm)  pm(j;ejm)]gMp(j;ejm);
and
Mp0(j;ej) = (1  )pm(j;ej)Ma(j;ej) + (1  )pm(j;ej)Mp(j;ej)(31)
+pm(j;ej)Sa(j)Sa(ej)=2 + #pm(j;ej)Sp(j)Sp(ej)=#2:
Take the law of motion forMa, as given by (28). The rst term represents those currently
attached pairs in A who choose to remain attached there next period. Specically, there
49
are (1  )Ma(j;ej) surviving matched pairs of type (j;ej). Of these the fraction am(j;ej) 2
f0; 1=2; 1g agree to be matched in A, as opposed to either matching in P or each party going
it alone. The second term in (28) calculates the number of currently matched pairs in P
who will enter into A next period. Next, consider the todays pool of single agents in A.
From this pool there will be Sa(j)Sa(ej)=2 matches of type (j;ej). Out of these pairs the
fraction am(j;ej) will agree to an abstinent match. This explains the third term. The fourth
term calculates the number of abstinent matches tomorrow that arise from todays pool of
singles in P.
Next, examine (29), or the law of motion for Sa. The rst term represents those who are
currently unattached in A and choose to remain there for next period [i.e., 1a;ps (j) = 1 in
line with (9)]. Some people who are unattached in P may choose to move to A. The number
of such people is given by the second term. The third term calculates the number of new
unattached teenagers who search for a mate in the abstinent class next period. Recall that
j is distributed according to the density J(j). The remaining terms count the number of
failed matches between person j and a prospective partner ej , where j decides to search next
period for a new mate in A [implying 1a;ps (j) = 1]. Sometimes two singles, j and ej, may meet
in either A or P and one of the parties wont want to match the fourth term for A and
the fth for P. Other times an existing abstinent match may breakup either exogenously or
endogenously the sixth term. The same could be true for promiscuous match the seventh
term. The other laws of motion can be explained in similar manner.
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12.3 Markov Chain for the Number of Partners
Using (18) and (19) set up a Markov chain as follows:26666666666666666664
m0t+1
u0t+1
m1t+1
u1t+1
...
uN 1t+1
mNt+1
uNt+1
37777777777777777775
=
26666666666666666664
(1  ) 0 0 0    0 0 0
 (1  ) 0 0 0 0 0
0  (1  ) 0 0 0 0
0 0  (1  ) 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
   1  
0 0 0 0  (1  ) 0
0 0 0 0     (1  )
37777777777777777775
26666666666666666664
m0t
u0t
m1t
u1t
...
uN 1t
mNt
uNt
37777777777777777775
;
which can be represent more compactly by
pt+1 = Ppt:
Note that
pt+1 = P
t+1p0;
where
pt+1 =
26666666664
pt+1;1
pt+1;2
pt+1;3
...
pt+1;2N+2
37777777775
and p0 =
26666666664
p0;1
p0;2
p0;3
...
p0;2N+2
37777777775
=
26666666664
0
1
0
...
0
37777777775
:
Hence, the mean number of sexual encounters for the experienced isPN+2 1
i=1 (pN;2i+1 + pN;2i+2)iPN+2
i=2 pN;i
:
12.4 Algorithm
The algorithm computes a transition path between two steady states. Pick a time horizon
T su¢ ciently large so that the economy will have converged to the nal steady state by
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this time. Set the period T value functions and type distributions to their nal steady-
state values. Likewise, x the period-1 type distributions at their values in the initial state.
Finally, pick the fctgTt=1 sequence so that the rst 4 (2002  1900) values match the time
series properties observed for the e¤ectiveness of contraception in the U.S. data. Set the
last T   4 (2002  1900) values equal to the number observed for 2002, which amounts to
assuming that there is no technological progress in contraception after this year.
1. Enter iteration i + 1 with a guess from the previous iteration for the time path of
Ma;Mp; Sa and Sp, denoted by fMa;it gT 1t=2 ; fMp;it gT 1t=2 ; fSa;it gT 1t=2 and fSp;it gT 1t=2 .
2. Solve the recursions (1) to (4) using this guess. Retrieve the time path for the pol-
icy functions associated with these recursions represented by f1a;i+1t gT 1t=1 ,f2a;s;i+1t gT 1t=1 ,
f1p;i+1t gT 1t=1 ,f2p;s;i+1t gT 1t=1 , f1a;p;i+1s;t gT 1t=1 , fam;i+1t gT 1t=1 , andfpm;i+1t gT 1t=1 . These are spec-
ied by (5) to (11).
3. Calculate new time paths for Ma;Mp; Sa and Sp, or fMa;i+1t gT 1t=2 , fMp;i+1t gT 1t=2 ,
fSa;i+1t gT 1t=2 and fSp;i+1t gT 1t=2 , using the laws of motion (28) to (31).
4. Check for convergence.
(a) If norm(fMa;i+1t ;Mp;i+1t ; Sa;i+1t ; Sp;i+1t gT 1t=2   fMa;it ;Mp;it ; Sa;it ; Sp;it gT 1t=2 ) < " then
stop, since a solution has been found.
(b) If not, then repeat Step 1 using fMa;i+1t gT 1t=2 , fMp;i+1t gT 1t=2 , fSa;i+1t gT 1t=2 and fSp;i+1t gT 1t=2
for the new guess.
12.5 Data Sources
 Figure 1
 left panel, premarital sex: For 1900, 1924 and 1934, the numbers are computed
from Kinsey et al. (1953, Table 83, p. 339); for 1958, 1961, 1965, 1971, 1976, 1979,
and 1982, the data is derived from Ho¤reth, Kahn and Baldwin (1987, Tables 2
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and 3, pp. 48-49); for 1988 and 1995, see Abma and Sonenstein (2001, Table
1, p. 28); for 2002, the fraction of 19 year-old females with premarital sexual
experience was obtained via private correspondence with Joyce Abma (Division
of Vital Statistics, National Center for Health Statistics). The data for 1900, 1924,
and 1934 are for white females.
 left panel, out-of-wedlock births: For 1920 and 1930, see Cutright (1972, Table
1, p. 383), and for the data between 1940 and 1999, see Ventura and Bachrach
(2000).
 right panel, number of partners: Laudmann et al. (1994, Table 5.5, p. 198).
 Table 1, contraception use at rst premarital intercourse: For 1900, see Himes (1963,
Table V, p. 345); for the years 1960-64, see Mosher and Bachrach (1987, Table 2, p.
87); for 1965-1988, the numbers are taken from Mosher and McNally (1991, Table 1, p.
110); for 1985-1995, the data are contained in Abma et al. (1997, Table 39, p. 49); for
1990-2002, the numbers are taken Mosher et al. (2004, Table 3, page 16). These papers
use di¤erent waves of the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG). The multiple
users were not reported until the 1995 NSFG. In Mosher et al. (2004), the percentage
of users for each method counts the users of multiple methods. Thus, the sum across
di¤erent methods is more than the total fraction who use any method. In Table 1
their percentage distribution across di¤erent methods is normalized to sum up to the
total fraction who use any method. The othermethods category includes the use
of diaphragms, cervical caps, IUDs, vaginal spermicides (such as foams, jellies, creams
and sponges), the rhythm method, and injections and implants which were introduced
in 1990s.
 Table 2, failure rates for condoms, the pill, withdrawal, and other methods: For all
contraceptives, failure rates are measured in terms of the percentage of women who
become pregnant during the rst year of use. First, for the period prior to 1960, see
the discussion in Section 7.2. Second, for the period 1960 to 2002 the sources are more
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varied. Hatcher et al. (1976, 1980) report a 15 to 20 percent failure rate of condoms
for typical users. Given the 10 to 20 percent failure rates given by Tietze (1970), it is
safe to set a 17.5 percent failure rate in Table 2 for the 1960-1982 period. Hatcher et
al. (1984, 1988) present 10, and 12 percent failure rates, respectively. Accordingly, an
average value of 11 percent is selected for the 1983-1989 period. Finally, Hatcher et
al (1998 and 2004) list 14 and 15 percent failure rates. For the 1990-2002 period the
average value of 14.5 percent is used. Hatcher et al. (1976, 1980) give 5 to 10 percent
and 10 percent failure rates for the typical use of the pill. Therefore, set the failure
rate at 7.5 percent for the 1960 to 1982 period. Hatcher et al. (1984, 1988) present
much lower failure rates of 2 and 4.7 percent. Accordingly, set the e¤ectiveness for
the 1983-1989 period to the average value of 3.35 percent. Finally, for the 1990-2002
period average the 3 percent failure rate reported by Hatcher et al. (1998) and Kelly
(2001) and the 8 percent failure rate given by Hatcher et al. (2004). The numbers for
withdrawal are again based on the estimates of Hatcher et al. (1976, 1980) who give 20
to 25 percent failure rates. The numbers for 1983-95 are based on Hatcher et al. (1984,
1989), who report 23 and 18 percent failure rates, while those for the 1995-2002 period
derive from Hatcher et al (1998 and 2004) who present 19 and 27 percent failure rates.
Finally, given the small number of people using other methods the results are not very
sensitive to the assumption made regarding their e¤ectiveness. A simple assumption is
made here that the failure rate for all other methods between 1960 and 1988 was about
20 percent, and then declined to 10 percent. According to Hatcher et al. (1976, 1980,
1984, 1988, 1998, and 2004) the failure rate of the IUD was about 6 to 10 percent in
1976, declined to about 5 percent in the 1980s, and nally reached 3 percent by 2004.
The failure rate for the diaphragm was about 20 to 25 percent in 1976, and remained
pretty much constant until recently. It had a 16 percent failure rate in 2004. The same
is also true for many vaginal spermicides (foams, jellies, sponges, etc.) that had about
20 to 30 percent failure rates during this entire period. Injections and implants, two
very e¤ective contraceptives, were introduced in the 1990s  see FDA (1997).
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 Figure 5,
 left panel, teenage pregnancies: Henshaw (2004 Table 1, p. 1) reports the number
of births, abortions, and miscarriages (the latter calculated as 20 percent of births
plus 10 percent of abortions) for all teenager, 15 to 19 years old, girls for the 1972-
2000 period. To calculate the number of pregnancies for unmarried teenager girls,
the number births and abortions for unmarried teenagers are needed. Births are
obtained from Ventura et al. (2001, Table 1, p. 10). The number of abortions,
however, is only available for all teenagers, and just for the post-1972 period.
Hence, certain assumptions are made to generate a pregnancy series for unmarried
teenagers. The series reported in the paper is based on a simple calculation.
For the 1972-2000 period it sums births to unmarried teenagers, all abortions to
teenagers, and miscarriages (calculated as 20 percent of births plus 10 percent of
abortions). For the 1960-1971 period it estimates the total number pregnancies
by simply assuming that the (abortions + miscarriages)/(out-of-wedlock births)
ratio took the same value as it did in 1972.
 right panel, abortion: The sources for the abortion numbers presented in this
gure are discussed in the data sources for left panel. The ratio of abortions to
pregnancies is calculated as the total number of abortions as reported by Henshaw
(2004) divided by the total number of pregnancies.
 Table 3, number of partners: The source is Abma et al. (2004, Table 13, p. 26). When
calculating the mean number of partners from this data a value of 8 is assigned for the
7+ category.
 Table 4  frequency of sex: Abma et al. (2004, Table 6, p. 21) provide numbers
for the frequency of sex for females aged 15-19 for the year 2002. Table 4 converts
their numbers so that they apply to sexually experienced girls. Specically, Abma
et al. (2004) report that only 45.5 percent of girls had experienced sex. So, their
numbers for the non-zero frequencies are scaled up by 1/0.455. The number for the
55
zero frequency in Table 4 is then simply taken to be one minus the sum over the non-
zero frequencies. The numbers in parenthesis in Table 4 present the data points used
to tabulate the mean.
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